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INTRODUCTION
1.1. A Perspective
John Arras and Nancy Rhoden open their book Ethical
Issues in Modern Medicine this way, "Perhaps there were
never any 'good old days* when life was simple, but life is
certainly more complex now than it once was. And one aspect
of this complexity is that it is often more difficult to
discern what we ought and ought not to do. This is
especially true in medicine and the life sciences in which
modern technology has created new possibilities related to
life itself entirely unknown a few years ago."-"- In the
United States the last three decades have been a successful
era in medicine. The physician Charles L. Sprung captures
the full impact of this technological revolution that took
place in medicine in an article published in the Journal of
the American Medical Association.^ Besides tracing its
history. Sprung shows by means of illustrations how the
technological revolution has affected physicians' abilities
to save lives. He makes a noteworthy point that technology
has not only enhanced the physicians' effectiveness as a
^John Arras and Nancy Rhoden, Ethical Issues in Modern
Medicine. 3rd ed. , (California: Mayfield Publishing Co., 1989) 1.
^Charles L. Sprang, "Changing Attitudes and Practices in
Forgoing Life-Sustaining Treatments, JAMA 263(16) (25 April 1990):
221-5.
care-giver, but it has made them able to interrupt the
normal dying process.
Society is reacting to the technological development in
a somewhat ambivalent manner. On the one hand there is
resounding joy and praise for a 'high tech' health care
system that has tremendous capability of extending life and
relieving suffering through care. On the other hand there
is a concern for rising costs that are pushing society to
requiring health care providers to use the existing
resources prudently. The problem of how to produce quality
health care while still containing costs is attracting the
attention of many scholars, and it is the major issue
discussed at many conferences on health-care delivery.
Attending to this issue is of utmost importance. The
figures tell us why. In forty years the number of Americans
in the United States over sixty-five will increase by a
hundred percent, but the number of tax-paying wage-earners
will only increase by thirty percent. So we are asking
ourselves the question "Who will pay the bill?" Society is
also concerned about the amount of health care dollars that
today is consumed by the elderly. This concern is even
greater over the use of life support systems in the
treatment of elderly patients who are critically ill. We
should mention that the use of such life support systems is
no longer limited to the intensive care unit of a large
hospital but has been extended to other medical facilities
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and even to home care. Their use has generated tremendous
expenses for the health-care system. We are spending one
percent of the Gross National Product on intensive care.
Public outcry over the disbursement of health-care resources
has led some to argue that in terms of increased rates of
survival and improved quality of life, investment in life
support systems is inefficient.
If this is the case, then society ought to seek ways to
reduce the utilization of life-support systems. A
suggestion would be to require physicians and other health
professionals to withhold and withdraw life-support systems
from certain critically-ill patients. In such cases, the
physician's assessment of the patient's quality of life
would serve as a touchstone for judgement. However, there
may be instances in which the judgement of physicians in
favor of withdrawing or withholding life-support from
patients may intentionally cause their death. These cases
would be acts of passive euthanasia, which is contrary to
the tradition of medical practice. Passive euthanasia is
the withholding of certain medical services in order to
allow the patient to die, again for benevolent reasons.-^
All evidence indicates a general public consensus that it is
inappropriate to employ life-support technologies where no
purpose is served but the prolongation of the dying process.
^Robert Wennberg, Terminal Choices: Euthanasia. Suicide and
the Right to Die. 108-156.
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However, the medical literature reveals that society has
experienced difficulty in translating this consensus into
practice. The problem of scarcity is moving society to find
an ethically reliable basis for distinguishing between acts
of passive euthanasia on the one hand, and legitimate
decisions to withdraw and withhold life-support systems from
critically-ill patients. The difference between them may be
whether or not death is intended.
Efficient utilization of resources is not the only
concern that leads to the discussion of foregoing life-
support systems. There also are several ethical concerns
that have nothing to do with scarcity and resources, but are
arising instead from the use of life-support systems
themselves. Indeed, scarcity is not the issue in the
prominent court cases involving the withdrawal of life-
support systems from patients like Karen Quinlan, Shirley
Dinnerstein and Nancy Cruzan. The nature of the support
systems themselves seems sometimes to insulate patients from
the normal process of dying. In these cases ethical issues
precipitated the decision to terminate their use. The
ethical issues centered around the way in which our society
understands human freedom, suffering and death. The problem
we are faced with is that society does not have a clearly-
held view about these moral concepts. Two major strengths
from which society derives its morality are Judaism,
Christianity and modern American secularism. Experience
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shows that these traditions have different views of human
freedom, suffering and death. Our task, then, is to find
the implications of various conceptions of human freedom,
suffering and death for the ethical issues of withdrawing
and withholding life-support systems from critically ill
patients .
Utilitarianism seems to be most dominant among the
philosophies that have currency in the contemporary American
secular scene. Consequently, it would be reasonable for us
to assume that the utilitarian ethic is pervasive in current
medical practice and medical decision-making. However, J.K.
Mason in his book Human Life and Medical Practice warned
that "the ethical practice of medicine rests upon an uneasy
confederation of deontology, religion, utilitarianism and
self-determination and being a public service, its pattern
is ultimately shaped by public conscience."^ Although
Mason includes religion as one of the forces influencing the
current practice of medicine, religion's influence on
medicine appears to be parochial. Theological reflection
has not been a major consideration in the contemporary
practice of medicine, nor has it been incorporated in the
statutes regarding health care.
Rev. Dennis Brodeur, a moral theologian, cites three
reasons why elected officials, judges and regulations might
^J.K. Mason, Human Life and Medical Practice (Edinburgh:
Edinburgh University Press, 1988), 7.
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not want to include religious language in health policy: to
maintain the separation of the church and the state, to use
philosophical and legal language which are more acceptable
to pluralistic society, and to avoid the difficulty of
translating religious language adequately into public
policy. However, he notes that religion can contribute to
health policy and health-care decision making. "The
contribution of religious and theological experience should
go beyond the briefs and legislative activities of national
and state groups to the construction of a framework for
ethical thinking that precedes the statues or court
decision. Too often, public policy is shaped by the
immediate case at hand and not by the foundational
issues . "^
Theology has made significant contributions to medicine
and bioethics, but its contributions have typically been
neglected. Earl E. Shelp and other scholars strongly
believe that theological reflection advances made in medical
research and technology is critically important. A fuller
treatment of this issue can be found in a volume edited by
Shelp entitled Exploring the Foundations of Frontier (a
collection of articles from seventeen contemporary
^Dennis Brodeur, "Ethical Decision-Making at the End of Life:
The Role of Religious Traditions and Public Policy." America vol.
163:11 (20 October, 1990): 207-271.
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theologians and theological ethicists) . The author's aim
is to affirm what theological scholarship has done for
medical ethics. The integration of theology and medicine
found in this volume is based on the conviction of some
scholars^ that a theological framework is necessary for
making certain medical choices. It is premature to expect
agreement on a single methodology for this integration. It
is our contention that theological reflection must be
included in our discussions if we are to find a reliable
basis for distinguishing between acts of passive euthanasia
and legitimate decisions to withhold and withdraw life
saving technologies that are futile and burdensome to the
patient. The Bible, as well as later theological writings,
can prove helpful here. Theological reflection may also
shed light on other ethical issues connected with life-
support systems. Indeed, in the face of recent ethical
dilemmas created by the use of life-support technologies,
many religious organizations and individual are turning to
their religious traditions for moral guidance.
Mason includes deontology as another force in
^Earl E. Shelp, Theology and Bioethics: Exploring the
Foundations of Frontier. (Dordrecht, Holland: Boston; O. Reidel;
Hingham, M.A. , U.S.A. Kulwer Academie, 1985).
^William K. Frankena believes that theology can contribute to
bioethics. In one of the chapters he examines "the Potential of
Theology to Bioethics", 49-64; Basil Mitchel did "the Role of
Theology in Bioethics", 65-68; Paul Lehmann in "Responsibility for
Life: Bioethics in Theology", 283-302, thinks that a non-
denominational approach to certain theological concepts will be
useful to bioethics.
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influencing the current practice of medicine. Deontological
theories are different from teleological theories, in that
they hold that an act is morally right if it conforms to
certain codes of laws or norms. One form of deontology is
exististentialism. Frederick Nietzsche is usually regarded
as an existentialist.�
First, the search for an ethical framework leads to an
examination of human freedom, suffering and death in current
medical practice. We shall work with the assumption that
utilitarianism predominates in the current medical practice.
Second, we shall analyze those same concepts within another
framework: denotological ethics. Third, attempting to
capture our moral intuitions, all of which are captured by
deontology and consequentialism, we shall examine these
concepts within a third ethical framework: biblical ethics.
1.2. Life Support Systems
Definition and Ethical Issues
The Encyclopedia of Bioethics defines life-support
systems as "heterogeneous collection of administered
synthetic, semi-synthetic, and natural agents which by
manual or automated means support or substitute for certain
^Howard A. Slaate, A Critical Survey of Ethics (Lanham:
University Press of America, 1988), 201-218.
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vital functions of a patient during the critical, life-
threatening phases of illness or injury."^
From this definition, it is obvious that the term life-
support system covers a wide range of techniques and
technology. The list extends from simple manipulative
physical techniques like cardiopulmonary resuscitation
techniques to sophisticated technologies like kidney
dialysis. They also include mechanical ventilation machines
and nasogastric feeding technologies. Despite the fact that
they cover such a wide variety, they all serve a single
purpose: "to aid and support or supplant a vital function
that has been severely impaired. "�'�^
The vital functions of our body include breathing,
feeding, and waste removal.
Often physicians' conceptions of critically ill
patients who have lost one or more functions are conditioned
by certain other patient characteristics. In a survey of
physicians. Crane has discovered that characteristics such
as "salvageability" and "damage" affect physicians'
perceptions .
A salvageable patient is one who can be restored
^Albert Jonsen and George Lister: "Life-Support Systems" in
Warren T. Reich, ed. , The Encyclopedia of Bioethics. 4 vols. (New
York: Macmillan, 1978) vol 2: 840-848.
-��^Jonsen, and Lister, 840.
^^Diana Crane, The Sanctity of Social Life: Physicians and the
Critically 111. (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1975), 13-15.
9
to health or maintained in a chronic condition for an
indefinite period, that is, one whose physiological
life can be saved. A damaged patient is one who,
because of physical or mental handicaps, cannot
resume (or assume) the normally expected range of
social roles. �'�^
The aforementioned patient characteristics are of
considerable relevance. Crane stresses that they form the
key decision-components as physicians consider whether to
initiate aggressive treatment techniques or technologies for
patients who are salvageable but have physical damage.
While other patients who are also salvageable may receive
less active treatment from physicians because they have
mental damage, patients who are perceived to be
unsalvageable and have mental damage are less likely to
receive any aggressive or heroic treatment at all.-"--^ This
gives us a sense of the complex nature of what is involved
in the treatment of critically ill. Withholding and
withdrawing of life-support are the processes by which
various medical life-support interventions either are not
given to or are removed from them.
The process of determining what to do with a critically
ill patient who needs life-support is a difficult one. An
easy way of out of this enigmatic situation could be to use
every available technology to save lives. Then the occasion
for making such decisions to forego life-support does not
^^Crane, 14
i^Ibid.
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even rise. Providing life-support to every critically ill
patient who needs it eases the need to make decisions. In
reality this not a satisfactory solution. Walton attempts
to justify the need to make decisions withdrawing aggressive
therapy including life-support in his book Ethics of
Withdrawal of Life-Support Systems. He frames his analysis
in the context of critical care, especially in terms of
patients in the intensive care unit (ICU) . We believe such
decisions are paradigm cases, whose analysis is applicable
to most clinical decisions involving withdrawing and
withholding life-support . -"-^ Pivotal in Watson's analysis
is the distinction between two categories of decisions: (1)
Decisions to withdraw or withhold life-support from patients
who are already dying. This is well captured as the
decision involving irreversibility. (2) Decisions to
withdraw or withhold life-support from patients who have the
potential of surviving current illnesses, but their lives
could become dependent on life-support . �'�^ Walton cites
two cases which we shall rewrite here to illustrate each of
his two categories. The first case he cites involves an
illustration of the first category.
Mr. Walden Asbury was a sixty-eight-year-old man who
had a stroke and was also suffering from burns over 45
percent of his body. He was awake but not
^'^Douglas N. Walton, Ethics of Withdrawal of Life-Support
Systems: Case Studies on Decision-Making in Intensive Care. (New
York: Praeger, 1983).
^^Walton, 38.
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communicative or very fully conscious during his stay
in the ICU. He suffered severe burn-related infections
and numerous cardiac arrests. Another man in the same
room caught the infection from Mr. Asbury and died. So
Mr. Asbury was put in isolation, utilizing a four-bed
ICU room by himself ... .After Mr. Asbury had been
undergoing treatment for three months, one physician
decided that, at best, the patient would remain a
functionless human being and that it was not
worthwhile to prolong his dying any further. The other
two physicians did not agree, however; and in
particular, a burn specialist, was very enthusiastic
about continuing aggressive treatments. Yet, when this
physician went on vacation, the level of active therapy
was reduced, and two weeks later Mr. Asbury died while
still on the ventilator . �'^^
With regard to this case, Walton mentions five reasons why
life-support should have been withdrawn from the patient.
Costs, suffering, irreversibility, the patient's choice and
disagreement among physicians . �'�^
The second case is an illustration of the
aforementioned second category of decisions.
Mr. B. was a sixty-seven-year-old emaciated recluse who
was found by his landlady in his room in a slumped,
semi-comatose state. He was brought to the Emergency
Room, where he was found to be in acute respiratory
distress with a blood pressure of 100 mm Hg, pulse rate
of 116 beats per minute, rectal temperature of 98.6
deg. F. , and respiratory rate of 4 0 breaths per minute.
Measurement of arterial blood gases while the patient
was breathing room air indicated a large component of
chronic lung disease (arterial P02 , 55 mm Hg; arterial
p 2/ 80 mm Hg; and arterial pH, 7.24). A chest x-ray
film on admission showed no acute pulmonary
infiltrates. Further arterial blood gases measured on
the afternoon of admission showed no improvement, and
the patient was intubated and placed on controlled
ventilation.
Following intubation and ventilation, the patient
became responsive and partially oriented. All causes
^%alton, 40-41.
^"^Walton, 42.
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of acutely reversible lung disease were explored and
treated to the best of the abilities of the
Respiratory-Surgical Intensive Care Unit (R-SICU)
Staff. His pneumonia was treated with antibiotics and
controlled ventilation with positive end-expiratory
pressure. Excess water in the lung was treated by
fluid restriction, albumin, and diuretic agents. The
dead space to tidal volume ratio indicated that
approximately two-thirds of every spontaneous breath
was wasted ventilation (VD/VT, 0.68). His malnutrition
was treated by tube feedings and food by mouth.
During the ensuing 2-1/2 months repeated efforts
were made to wean Mr. B. from the ventilator. Each
time the ventilator was stopped and he was allowed to
breathe spontaneously, the arterial P^^2 would rapidlyrise to 80 or 90 mm Hg. , he would become anxious and
frightened, and he would indicate frantically his
desire to be returned to the ventilator. On one
occasion, a cardiac arrest occurred during a trial of
weaning. All efforts to wean him from the ventilator
were met. He became extremely dependent and attached
to his nurses in the R-SICU. He frequently said he
wished to die, although it was not at all clear to
those who were caring for him whether his wish to die
was an acceptance of his ultimate fate or whether he
was extremely uncomfortable and depressed at the
realization of his complete dependency on the
ventilator.
Many hours of agonizing discussion with his
nurses, R-SICU physicians, psychiatrists, and a social
worker concerned the issue of discontinuation of
mechanical ventilation, which would almost surely
result in his death. Since Mr. B. was alert and
oriented when his arterial P^q2 in the near-normal
range, discontinuation of ventilation was a
particularly difficult dilemma. During the 2-1/2 month
period of his stay in the R-SICU, many other acutely
ill patients were denied admission because he occupied
a bed. Ultimately, because he could not be
successfully weaned from the ventilator, and because a
consensus decision to terminate his ventilation could
not be reached by all those who were caring for him, he
was transferred to a medical floor, where his
ventilation was maintained by a volume-constant
ventilator. Two weeks later, he died. His hospital
care had cost $41,846.14 (not an out of the way
figure) . -'�^
Watson believes that the physicians should have made a
^^Ibid.
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decision to discontinue the use of life-support . -"-^ Based
upon the preceding discussions, we make the assumption that
there are cases in which it is justifiable to withdraw or
withhold life support systems from critically ill patients.
Such decisions to forego life-support raises ethical
problems, which may take different shapes depending on the
type of life-support system. Evidently, physicians are
still cautious in making decisions when they involve
foregoing life-support systems. They are afraid that
patients and their families could initiate criminal or civil
proceedings against them. Quite apart from legal
considerations, physicians are still not sure yet it is
ethical to withhold or withdraw life-supports from a
critically ill patient. There is a growing consensus that a
physician should withhold and/or withdraw them from
terminally-ill patients. ^� Another issue that may give
rise to ethical concerns is directly related to scarcity of
medical resources. The issue here is how can the limited
resources like life-support systems be allocated ethically?
Who should be asked to carry the financial burden of
patients if they are dependent on life-support for the rest
of their lives?
l^ibid.
^�Council Report on Scientific Affairs on Ethical and Judicial
Affairs, Presistent Vegetative State and the Decision to Withdraw
or Withhold Life Support, American Medical Association (Chicago) ,
426-429 .
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These are some of the ethical questions involving life-
support systems. A fuller treatment of these issues is
beyond our scope. Our task is to see how the various
conceptions of human freedom, suffering and death affects
decisions to forego life-support. In the next chapter we
shall examine how decisions to forego life-support systems
are currently made. The aim will be to determine within
what philosophical theory fit those underlying conceptions
of human freedom, suffering and death pivotal in these
decisions .
To be able to get into the mechanics of the current
decision-making process, we shall divide life-support
systems into two categories: (1) simple life support, e.g.,
cardio-pulmonary resuscitation, and (2) advanced life-
support technologies, e.g., mechanical ventilator and
nasogastric feeding techniques. We shall discuss these
separately.
1.3 Statement of Problem
The purpose of this study will be to compare biblical,
and philosophical conceptions of human freedom, suffering.
^�'^Numerous articles appearing in different medical journals.
See (1) Geoffrey Draun, Sheila Adams et al.. Withdrawal of life-
support from Patients in Permanent Vegative State. Lancet 337:8133,
(12 Janury, 1991): 96-98; Nicholas G. Smedera, Bradley H. Evans,
Linda S. Gracs, Neal H. Cohen, Bernard Lo et al., Withholding Life-
Support from the Critically 111. New England Journal of Medicine,
Vol. 332:5 (1 February 1, 1990): 309-315; Jonsen and Lister: Life-
Support Systems in Warren T. Reich, ed. , The Encyclopedia of
Bioethics (New York: Macmillan, 1978) Vol. 2: 843-848.
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and death, and to analyze the implications of these
conceptions for making decisions to withdraw and withhold
medical treatment.
1.4 Method of Study
This investigation will begin with a review of existing
literature on decisions to withdraw and withhold treatment
with the intention of identifying: 1) Various ways in which
these decisions are made, and 2) the ways in which the
underlying conceptions of human freedom, suffering, and
death are pivotal in making them.
Next, major conceptions of human freedom, suffering and
death, will be individually examined (analytically where
explicit, inductively where implicit) . Exemplifying a
biblical perspective will be the New Testament; and
exemplifying a philosophical perspective will be Frederick
Nietzsche.
Finally, how biblical and philosophical conceptions of
human freedom, suffering and death shape decisions to
withdraw and withhold medical treatment will be studied.
16
CHAPTER 2
DECISIONS INVOLVING FORGOING LIFE SUPPORT:
CURRENT PRACTICE
2 . 1 Introduction
In this section chapter we intend to find out the views
of human freedom, suffering and death in current medical
practice, especially in decisions involving critically ill
patients forgoing life support. We will establish a link
between these conceptions of human freedom, suffering and
death with actual decisions through an analysis of the
reasons physicians cite as justifications for withholding
and withdrawing life support. Through this analysis we seek
to find out: (1) how the conceptions of human freedom,
suffering and death are pivotal in such decisions and (2)
what moral principles or theories form the foundation for
the decisions.
2.2 Simple Life Support and Do-Not-Resuscitate Orders
The first of such decisions confronting physicians
involving critically-ill patients is whether to institute
cardiopulmonary resuscitation in the event of
cardiopulmonary arrest or to withhold it by employing a do-
17
not-resuscitate order. As popular as do-not-resuscitate
orders have become, guidelines have been developed to
facilitate the process by which decisions regarding them
could be made. Among voluminous literature that deals with
DNR decisions is the book edited by Martin Strosberg, I.
Alan Fein and James D. Carroll, Rationing of Medical Care
For the Critically 111. (In chapter one of this book) ,
Robert Baker analyzes the characteristics of exiting "DNR"
orders, noting their similarities and their differences.
The authors point out that soon after do-not-resuscitate
orders were established, they were soon restricted to
certain classes of patients. Moreover, they noted that all
do-not-resuscitate orders accept brain death as an
appropriate reason for withdrawing life-support, and that
certain clauses in those guidelines require do-not-
resuscitate orders be entered in the patient's records. -'^
Again from Baker's article and the medical literature, two
types of DNR orders seem predominant. The most prevalent
type is conceived as a protocol which ratifies patient's
rights to consent and refuse treatment. The second type is
protocol that formalizes the physician's rights to determine
which therapies are appropriate to the treatment of a
patient's conditions and to withdraw and withhold
^Robert Baker, Do-Not-Resuscitate Orders in Martin A.
Strosberg, I. Alan Fein and James D. Carroll (ed.). Rationing of
Medical Care for the Critically 111 (Washington, D.C.: The
Brookings Institution, 1986) 55.
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"ineffective, fatal, contratherapeutic treatments".^ When
it comes to explicating the reasons from critically ill
patients the majority of authors tend to lump all the
reasons together.
A decision not to resuscitate is considered for a
variety of reasons; a request by a patient or family;
advanced age of the patient; poor prognosis; severe
brain damage; extreme suffering or disability in a
chronically or terminally ill patient, and in some
instances, the enormous cost and personal commitment as
opposed to the low probability of patient recovery.-^
However, a minority of scholars^ classify these reasons
into three categories: no medical benefit, poor quality of
life after cardiopulmonary CPR and poor qualify of life
before cardiopulmonary resuscitation. No medical benefit
refers to a situation where a physician, after careful
analysis of all the factors, decides that the patient is in
such a bad shape that he or she will not benefit from CPR.
The physician is under no obligation to provide CPR to such
a patient. The other two categories are self explanatory.
Poor quality of life before cardiopulmonary resuscitation
involves the physician's expectations of the patient's
condition after treatment. Certainly differences exist
between the three distinctive rationales that physicians are
using to justify do-not-resuscitate orders. In some ways,
^See Robert Baker, 57.
�^George J. Annas, CPR: When the Beat Should Stop, Hastings
Center Report 12:5 October, 1982, 30-31.
"^This minority of scholars includes George J. Armas, Tom
Tomlinson, and Howard Brody.
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they are all based upon quality of life considerations. The
most important difference between the first reason and the
other two put together lies in the degree to which
physicians include patients' values in the decision-making
process .
When "no medical benefit" is cited as the rationale for
do-not-resuscitate orders, patients' values are irrelevant
to the decision-making process. The physician may not have
consulted with patients or their families before coming up
with this decision. However, in such decisions physicians
have no duty to ascertain patients ' preferences about
treatment. It is a purely medical decision, although it may
hide quality of life judgments based upon physicians'
subjective views. Here, physicians' conceptions of human
suffering and death have a major influence on their
decision. For this reason we might put it under the
"physician decision-making category".
When making decisions based upon the remaining two
rationales�poor quality of life before CPR and poor quality
of life after CPR�physicians often request patients' or
their family's consent.^
Since they are decisions which depend upon assessment
of the patient's quality of life, either before or after the
CPR, they require the application of a set of values that
^Tom Tomlinson and Howard Brody, "Ethics and Communication in
Do-Not-Resuscitate Orders Sound Board" New England Journal of
Medicine 318:1 (January 7, 1988): 43-46.
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determine whether the benefits of continued life outweigh
any associated harm such as pain or disability. But
physicians' values may differ from those of the patient or
the patient's family acting as proxy, and since the patient
has both a legal and moral right to accept or refuse
treatment in accordance with his or her values, the values
used to make these quality of life determinations are
properly the patient's. But the fact the physicians
sometimes allow the view of the patients or their proxy,
there is a sense of human freedom inherent in the decision.
Such conception of human freedoms pivotal in these decisions
is expressed in terms of autonomy. The terms we came
across, "autonomy" and "quality of life", will be discussed
in a later section.
2.3 Decisions Involving Life Support Technologies:
Mechanical Ventilation and Nasogastric
Feeding Techniques
Generations that lived before us have always believed
that the physician knew better about healing than any other
person. They were forced to accept clinical judgment as
final. The 1970s heralded a new movement which sought to
guarantee patients' rights. We identified several reasons
for the rise of the patients' rights movement. Most of them
are reasons which we discussed earlier while introducing
this branch of study. We made mention of recent
technological breakthroughs in medicine with its antecedent
problems precipitating changes in the medical decision-
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making process. Increasingly physicians are no longer seen
as infallible friends of the patient, and medical decisions
they make are sometimes challenged by patient and/or their
families. The physician is no longer the dominant player in
medical decision-making regarding the withdrawal and
withholding of life support systems from critically ill
patients. Rather, in accordance with a thesis put forward
by Walton^, this decision-making process may be likened to
a game with two possible outcomes. Applying Walton's
thesis, we were able to identify three models of decision
making: physician-based, patient-based, and court-based.
We shall examine each of these decision-making models
with the aim of understanding how the decisions are
achieved, whose opinions are heard and who makes the final
decision. We shall also examine the bases upon which the
decisions hinged, considering the source to which the
concepts of human freedom, suffering and death are pivotal
in reaching these decision.
2.3.1 Phvsician-Based Decision
Physician-based decisions include all those decisions
to forgo life-support in which the doctor is the final
arbiter of the decision. The use of life-support systems
may have been extended to other units besides intensive care
units, even to home care facilities, but the forum in which
^Walton, 211.
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physicians decide to withhold or withdraw them from any
patient is still the hospital rounds. We must not forget
the functioning of various hospital ethics committees who at
times are the final decision-makers. The existence of
certain hospital guidelines should not be overlooked.
Physicians' decisions to withdraw life support may only be a
reflection of such guidelines.
The extent to which physicians may be the final arbiter
in the decision-making process depends upon the requirements
of the personnel matrix within which they are working. If
they are the sole persons responsible for the critically ill
patient, then their opinions are may be the only ones that
count. Increasingly, critically ill patients, especially
those cared for in the intensive care unit, have medical
teams made up of physicians, medical technicians and other
professionals to care for them. Ernest Kraybill explains
that in team-work situations senior physicians are not only
consulting with experienced nurses and other medical
professionals on the team to get their opinion on critical
issues, including the ethical issues to which this work is
devoted, but also these non-physicians sometimes have the
dominant voice in making the decision to withdraw or
withhold life support. However, he admits that physicians
are still captains of the ICU teams, because they still have
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the right to reject such opinions.^
Edmund A. Murphy describes the general characteristics
of medical decision-making. The most influential of these
characteristics on physicians who are making decisions to
forgo life-support in judgment is clinical judgment.� The
literature reveals that some of the prominent reasons which
physicians cite for reaching their decisions to forgo life-
support are all based upon clinical judgment. These involve
severe brain damage, advanced age of the patient, extreme
suffering or disability, poor prognosis and various quality
of life considerations.^ Of these brain death and
considerations involving quality of life seem to be the most
important and prominent. Choosing to explore brain death
would also afford us a chance to discuss the concept of
death prevalent in decisions involving forgoing life-
support. By so doing, we might determine the underlying
philosophical framework upon which the concept of death is
built.
'Ernest N. Kraybill/Team medicine in the NICU: Ship or
Flotilla of Lifeboats? Nancy M. P. King, Larry R. Churchill, and
Alan W. Cross, The Physician as Captain of the Ship (Dordrecht;
Boston: D. Reidel: Norwell, MA USA Kluner Academic Publishers,
1988), 77-88.
�E.A. Murphy, "Classification and its Alternatives in Clinical
Judgment: A Critical Appraisal (A.T. Engelhardt, Stuart F. Spuker
and Bernard Powers, ed.) (Dordrecht; Holland; Boston; D. Reidel
Pub. Co., 1979).
^S.H. Wanser, D.D. Ferdman, and S.T. Edelstein, et al. , "The
Physician's Responsibility Toward Hopelessly 111 Patients: A
Second Look," New England Journal of Medicine 320 (1989): 844-849.
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2.3.1.1 Brain Death
The literature realizes a distinction between clinical
and biological death. For instance, the heartsaver manual
of the American Heart Association defines clinical death as
occurring when "the heartbeat and breathing have stopped."
And it adds: "this is best thought of as near or apparent
death, and it may be averted or reversed." The same manual
defines biological death as permanent brain death due to
lack of oxygen. This death is final.
-"-^ The effort to
avert and reverse clinical death may involve initiation of
life support. Reversal of clinical death with the help of
life support is sometimes problematic, especially in cases
where the lift-support was initiated sometime after damage
had been done to the patient's brain. Physicians do not
expect such patients to return to productive lives.
Attempts to restore the patient to life may result in lower
brain or upper brain damage. Illustrations which we will
give later will be helpful to clarify this point.
But first of all let us make a connection between
biological death and decisions to forgo life support. We
can conclude that medical decision-making within the
framework of the biological definition of death maintains
that life-support should not be withdrawn or withheld from
patients in situations where the patient may suffer partial
^�American Heart Association, "Heartsavers Manual".
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brain damage. This presents a dilemma especially when the
removal of advanced life-support from these patients might
cause their immediate death, which could be an act of
passive euthanasia. However, numerous observers of medical
ethics are saying that at least two more categories of
patients should be treated as brain dead: those who have
experienced neocortical death and those in a persistent
vegetative state. Their basic argument, as we shall see
later, concerns the definition of personhood. If this
proposal is accepted by the medical community, then
physicians would have the right to withdraw some form of
life-support from those patients . But the prevailing
view of death among physicians is of the whole brain
formulation. The view holds that clinical death or cardiac-
based death is not final. Supporters advocate initiating
life-support to victims, if the patient is clinically dead
but as long as biological death has not yet occurred.
Historically, we can trace the whole brain death
formulation to the Uniform Determination of Death Act
recommendation put forward by the President's Commission for
the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and
Behavioral Research in 1981. The Commission's publication
Defining Death�Medical. Legal and Ethical Issues in the
Determination of Death described adequately their
�'�-'�David Randolph Smith, "Notion of Neocortical Death" in R.M.
Zaner (ed.) Death Beyond Whole-Brain Criteria (MA/Dordrecht: Kluwer
Academic Publisher, 1988), 111-134.
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understanding of death. Critics like John Lachs pointed out
that their views are based upon a simplistic assumption:
"that there is a distinct difference between the temporal
process of dying and death, which is an instantaneous
event. "-'�^ Lachs notes that this assumption made it easy
for them to define death, because the assumption set death
and living as mutually exclusive events. A person is either
dead or alive. He observes that the Commission cited the
views of some philosophers to support their definition.
However, it did not help them relieve the definition from
its simplistic nature. �'��^ Death is still defined as a
single event in nature. Richard Zaner comments:
The kind of patient which the commission and other
worth-while brain advocates took as the paradigm for
defining human death, however, is distinctly different
from those in a persistent vegetative state. For the
commission, only associated with the brain stem, are
properly regarded as dead: that is, those who have lost
not only the higher functions supporting consciousness
but also the reflexes controlled by the brain stem (gag
reflex, swallowing, the urge to breathe, etc) . Even
though circulation and respiration in such individuals
can be maintained by mechanical means for a short time,
what has been listed is the central trait distinguishing
between the living and the dead, namely 'the body's
capacity to organize and regulate itself. ' Death in
these terms is that moment at which the body ' s
physiological system ceases to constitute an
integrated whole.
In addition, critics have cited a number of assumptions upon
^2John Lacks, "The Element of Choice in Criteria of Death" in
R.M. Zaner (ed.) Death Bevond Whole-Brain Criteria (MA/Dordrecht:
Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1988), 233.
l^Ibid., 234.
^'^R.M. Zaner, Death Beyond Whole-Brain Criteria, 3.
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which this view of death is founded: (1) the brain carries
out the most significant function in the physiological
system of the human body. (2) The function of the brain is
integrator of all other functions including breathing and
blood circulation. Therefore, the loss of the brain
signifies a loss of integration of the bodily processes.
This means death. Death is defined in purely physiological
terms :
In the end, the commission and other whole brain
advocates have opted for a philosophical view which
identifies human life with strictly organic, bodily
conditions: the moment at which the body's
physiological system ceases to constitute an integrated
whole in the commissions' own words. -"-^
Despite the criticism this position is still the dominant
view of death. �'�^
We now present an illustration involving specific cases
which will suffice to give readers a better understanding of
the whole brain definition. They will also provide insights
into the criticism that has been levied against it and help
us understand why some scholars are presenting new arguments
for a neocortical definition of death. Case one is a
classic example of a brain dead patient.
This patient has suffered massive destruction of the
entire brain, resulting in the loss of both higher and
lower functions. In addition to being permanently
unconscious, he has lost all ability to organize vital
15 Ibid 9.
16 Ibid. , 6.
�^Ibid vii .
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vegetative subsystems, such as breathing, neuroendocrine
control, blood pressure, temperature regulation, etc.
However, many of these functions can be supported or
replaced by skilled personnel and sophisticated
technology. After the patient is put on a respirator,
the staff monitors his blood oxygen concentration and
adjusts the rate and depth of breathing. Blood pressure
is checked and supported, if necessary, with
vasopressors. Electrolyte and fluid balances are
monitored and adjusted when necessary. Nutrition is
provided intravenously through a hyperalimentation line.
The patient's heart continues to pump blood, which has
been oxygenated and loaded with nutrients, to various
parts of the body, enabling the continuation of other
functions. The skin is warm, the kidneys continue to
produce urine, as the hair grows, and the liver
continues its many functions, such as the removal of
waste products from the blood. �'�^
This patient is a classic example of the destruction of the
whole brain. Case two is an example of a patient whose
higher brain is destroyed.
Unlike the preceding case, the patient's lower brain
structures have been left intact and functioning.
Although he can breathe spontaneously and maintain
temperature and blood pressure, he has irreversibly
lost the functions of consciousness and cognition.
Although such a patient requires much less attention
and technical support than the first one, he would
not survive long without assistance. Liquified food
must be placed directly into the stomach through a
gastrostomy or nasogastric tube. Because he is
incapable of moving on his own, he must be frequently
turned to prevent the development of bedsores, which
would lead to infection and death. His excretions
must also be managed. The patient is unable to do or
understand anything at all.-"-^
Case 3 is called the locked-in patient. The patient's lower
brain has been destroyed.
^�Case #1, 2, 3 are taken from Edward T. Bartlett and Stuart
J. Younger, "Human Death and the Destruction of the Neocortex" in
R.M. Zaner Death; Beyond Whole-Brain Criteria (Dordrecht; Boston;
London: Kluner Academic Publishers, 1988), 204-206.
i^Ibid.
29
This patient suffers significant, but incomplete,
destruction of the brain. Unlike the Quinlan-like
patient in Case #2, the brain portions responsible for
consciousness and cognition are intact. All portions
of the brain stem and deep cerebral areas responsible
for integration of vegetative functions have been
destroyed. However, the blood supply and neural
connections to the other cerebral areas, as well as
the reticular activating system located in the brain
stem, have been spared. Although the patient cannot
spontaneously regulate respiration, blood pressure,
temperature, hormonal balance, and other functions, he
is awake and alert. Let us also assume that the brain
stem areas responsible for hearing and eye movement
remain unaffected, so that he can give meaningful
responses to questions by moving and blinking his
eyes (e.g., one blink means yes and two blinks mean
no) .
Like patient #1 with total brain destruction, this
patient's life can only be maintained through the full
efforts of the Intensive Care Unit Staff. ^�
The whole brain death criteria would consider the
patient in Case #1 dead, but would not consider those
patients in Case #2 and #3 dead. Because of this, Barlett
and Younger call this standard for defining death, "a
primarily physiological standard. They believe that
the whole brain criteria assumes a purely biological view of
human death and life, which fails to consider personhood in
its conceptualization. In addition, Barlett and Young note
that whole brain criteria portray a one-dimensional view of
human life and death. Of course, criteria which
2�lbid.
^^Bartlett and Younger, 199-216.
22ibid.
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perceive human beings only as biological entities would
presuppose human life and death to be primarily biological.
Critics say that the disadvantage in defining human
essence in purely biological terms lies in the fact that
other human dimensions such as the ability to think, reason
and have social intercourse could be considered non
essential. Consequently, they will not be considered as
factors in the determination of death. But if we consider
them to be essential factors, then our concepts of
personhood changes. Persons are no longer only biological
organisms but organisms that are able to reason, think and
relate to each other. We see here that defining death
largely hinges on our concept of 'person'. The concept of
personhood is crucial to our understanding of death. The
Commission failed, however, to define personhood . ^'^
The relevance of the concept of personhood in
determining death comes out strongly in the publication.
Death: Beyond Whole Death Criteria edited by Richard M.
Zaner. The book is a critical appraisal of whole brain and
neocortical definitions of death. In this volume David
Randolph Smith examines the legal issues that have prompted
the neocortical definition. And while authors like Robert
Veatch, Roland Puccetti, Edward Barlett and Stuart Younger
advance arguments against the whole-brain formulation in
2^R.M. Zaner, 7-13.
^'^R.M. Zaner, 7-13.
31
favor of neocortical death definition. Of relevance to
us is the troubling question: Is it moral to withdraw or
withhold life-support from patients who have lost only their
higher brain functions? How are we to perceive and
treat irreversibly unconscious patients? These questions
are put in clear terms by David Randolph Smith:
Which analysis for treating the irreversibly unconscious
as dead makes sense: withholding or stopping feeding or
life support therapy because patients are already dead
or terminating treatment or life-sustaining nourishment
of living persons because that is what substituted
decision-makers suspect the patients would have
wanted?2^
Smith comments further that if the public was to accept the
neocortical death definition, substituted judgment would be
irrelevant.
We came to our discussion of brain death because
physicians use it presently to justify their decisions to
withdraw and withhold life-support from critically ill
patients. In our effort to find out what they mean by brain
death, we came across two different formulations of brain
death, the widely accepted whole brain criteria and the
recently proposed higher brain formulation. In whole brain
death, the criteria currently used to determine death does
not seem to have any philosophical basis: deontological or
utilitarian. In fact, from our discussion it becomes
obvious that resolving ethical questions connected with
^^R.M. Zaner, ed. , Death: Beyond the Whole-Brain Criteria.
^^David Randolph Smith, "Notion of Neocortical Death", 124.
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brain death will necessitate a conceptual analysis of death.
It seems as if any consideration of any ethical question
presupposes a semantical one.
2.3.1.2 Quality of Life Considerations
Physicians may decide to withhold or withdraw life-
support from critically ill patients for reasons other than
brain death. In some of these cases physicians' judgments
may involve patients' quality of life. For example
physicians might judge that a patient is in such bad shape
that after treatment his or her quality of life would be
such that it would be advantageous to withhold life support
or to withdraw support already initiated. There are
enough evidences that considerations of patients' quality of
life has been a major factor influencing decisions on
whether to withdraw or withhold life-support.^� When they
become the principal factor for making the decision,
physicians more often decide to forego life support than
decide to use them.^^
The term quality of life can have several meanings.
However, its use in the medical literature is limited to
^^Nicholas G. Smedira, Bradley H. Evans, Linda S. Gar is et
al., "Withholding and Withdrawal of Life Support From the
Critically 111," The New England Journal of Medicine 322, no. 7 (1
February 1990): 309.
2�ibid.
2^R.A. Perlman and A. Jonsen, "The Use of Quality of Life
Considerations in Medical Decision-Making," Journal of the American
Gerontological Society 33 (1985): 344-350.
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three possibilities.^" "Of relevance to us is the
definition of quality of life judgements as 'an evaluation'
by an onlooker of another person's life situation. "�^�'�
This definition is relevant to the situations with which we
are concerned�situations in which physicians make
evaluative judgments about patients' conditions that reflect
their own personal views. Physicians consider quality of
life in this way frequently in the clinical setting,
especially in making decisions to withhold or withdraw life-
support systems from critically-ill patients. Enough
evidence exists to support the assertion that in many
quality of life decisions physicians consider age as a
factor, when they have to decide whether a critically-ill
patient should forego life support. -^-^ The age factor may
sometimes become the deciding component, when the physician
thinks that the initiation or continuance of life-support
�^^Terrie Wettle, Julie Cwikel, and Sue E. Levkoff, "Geriatric
Medical Decisions: Factors Influencing Allocation of Scarce
Resources and the Decision to Withhold Treatment," The
Geriontologis 28(3) (1988), 336-348.
^^Ibid.
�^^David C. Thomason, Quality of Life Judgements, Treatment
Decisions and Medical Ethics, Clinics in Geriatric Medicine, 2
(February): 17-27; R.A. Perlman and A. Jonsen, "The Use of Quality
of Life Considerations in Medical Decision-Making", Journal of
American Gerontolqoical Society 33 (1985) : 344-350.
�^�^Terri T. Wetle, "Age As A Risk Factor for Inadequate
Treatment," Journal of American Medical Association (July 24/31):
516; Sue Levkoff and Terrie Wetle, "Clinical Decison Making in the
Care of the Aged," Journal of Aging and Health 1 (February 1989):
83-101.
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would subject the patient to undue suffering. There are
instances in which physicians have refused to intubate
elderly patients because of their expected quality of life.
The justification was that elderly patients cannot hold out
against would-be pain that life-support would cause
them.-^^ Physicians are not only concerned with
suffering, v;hen they make quality of life decisions.
Sometimes, they do reach such decisions after a careful
consideration of mixed combination of factors. Among
them are the patient's experience, an estimation of the
patient's survival time, and a host of factors based upon
social considerations.-^^ A significant social factor that
usually influences physicians' perceptions of their
critically-ill patients is mental health status.^� An
example will illustrate how mental health status may come to
bear on what the physician may decide.
Sharon Siebert was forty-one years old, had been
seriously brain damaged in an operation five years
previously, and according to her physicians, had a life
expectancy of thirty-seven more years. She had a mental
age of a two-year-old with no prospects for
improvements. She had to be fed artificially because
she could not swallow, was confined to a bed or
wheelchair, and could communicate only 'slightly'
and 'simply'. A DNR order was issued by her physicians,
^"^Terrie Wettle, Julie Cwikel, and Sue E. Levkoff, 336-343.
3^Ibid.
^^Perlman and Jonsen, 1985, 344-350.
^�^Ibid.
^�Sue Levkoff and Terrie Wetle, (1989), 86.
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with the consent of her parents. '
This DNR decision was based on quality of life assessment,
and the patient's mental health.
Quality of life decision-making should involve two
separate categories of factors. First are those connected
with the medical aspects of the patient's illness. We are
speaking of those assessments which the physician makes of
patients that are based upon quantifiable and measurable
aspects of disease processes . Secondly, those factors
which are not easily quantifiable and measured, which make
for "clinical uncertainties" and value judgments .
The criticism that physicians often are reluctant to
include the second set of factors has been levied by some
authors. '^^ If this is the case, then decisions to forego
life support system based upon quality of life judgements
are less than ideal. In the ideal decision, physicians
should attend all of the components. Sometimes, however,
physicians face up to the fact that they cannot divorce
medical judgement and values. They do involve value
judgment in their assessments of patients' quality of life.
�^^Daniel Callahan, "CPR The Beat Should Stop," Hastings Center
Report ?
*�Sue Levkoff and Terri Wetle, 97.
4iibid.
"^^ibid.
^^Ibid.
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But the problem is that they use "their own subjective
values relative to the patient's characteristics".'^'^ We
cannot blame them entirely because we recognize that it is
difficult to associate considerations of the quality of life
with any objective ethical stance. '^^ Perlman and Jonsen
put it this way:
If consideration of quality of life were a clearly
defined professional responsibility, it might have
correlated with the ethic of social responsibility.
And if the consideration of quality of life
represented attempts to avoid patients harm or
promote patients well-being, it might have correlated
as with the ethic of personal conscience. However,
as neither ethical stance appeared to be associated
with the quality of life, the principled rationale
for such consideration is yet undefined.
Besides the lack of an objective ethical standard for
determining quality of life, they doubt the accuracy of
physicians' assessment of patients' quality of life for two
further reasons. First, such assessments depend upon
diagnosis and prognosis which are inherently uncertain.
Second, the circumstances in which they are made are often
situations of tremendous pressure.
A contra-argument is levied by Warren Reich. According to
him, the quality of life when used in the context of a
morally normative judgment, depends upon an ethical theory
'*'*Robert A. Perlman and Albert Jonsen, 344.
^^Ibid.
"^^Ibid., 347.
^^Perlman and Jonsen, 344-352.
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of consequentialism.
We accept that it is based upon consequentialism.
2.3.2 Patient Made Decisions
The patient's right to decide to forego life support is
based upon the theory of informed consent.'*^ The concept
of informed consent makes it the physician's duty to inform
patients about the benefits and risks of any diagnostic and
treatment alternatives. In compliance with the principle of
informed consent, physicians are required to give their
patients full information about the diagnosed diseases as
well as treatment alternatives. They are also required to
supply information about the risks and benefits associated
with each treatment option presented to the patients. ^�
Jay Katz has traced the history and development of the
concept of informed consent in an article Informed Consent
in Therapeutic Relationships: Law and Ethics. In it he
describes informed consent as the process involving
physicians informing patients for the purpose of decision
making. Katz cites two basic trends behind the theory of
consent. First, modern physicians have become knowledgeable
people who have acquired considerable useful information
about their specialties. They are aware of new discoveries
"^^Encyclopedia of Bioethics. Warren T. Reich ed.
"^^Paul S. Appelbaum, Charles W. Lidz, and Alan Neisel,
Informed Consent: Legal Theory and Clinical Practice.
5�Ibid.
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in other branches of medicine as well as their own. They
possess a certain sense of confidence. Because of this new
found confidence, physicians are much more ready to educate
patients about their conditions. Second, there is a
tendency in a pluralistic society to think that every
individual has a certain value preference. Society wants to
guarantee the expression of individual preferences. This
can only be done by allowing the individual personality
autonomy to decide on all matters that affects him or her.
Even decisions pertaining to life and death must be based
upon individual values.
Informed consent therefore puts final word in the
decision-making process about foregoing life-support in the
hands of patients. Their opinions are the most important,
especially in cases where critically ill patients are
competent enough to make decisions. However, in cases where
patients are unconscious or incompetent, they may not be
able to voice their opinions. This would have meant that
their opinions would not be the decisive factor in decisions
that affected them. Advance directives legislation did
provide for such scenarios in the form of living wills and
durable power of attorneys.
^�"�Jay Katz, "Informed Consent in Therapeutic Relationship: Law
and Ethics," in Encyclopedia of Bioethics. Warren T. Reich, ed. ,
vol. 2, 770-778.
^^K.A. Singleton and R. Dever, "The Challenge of Autonomy
Respecting the Patient's Wishes," Dimension of Critical Care
Nursing 10 no. 3 (May-June 1991): 160-8.
39
2.3.2.1 Advanced Directives
The idea behind advanced directives is that adults are
capable of setting out their wishes about certain life-
sustaining treatments. They can do so in the form of
written instructions which could be put to use in times when
those persons are no longer able to make their wishes known.
The living will is one form of instruction directive. (See
appendix for Living Will) . There are many versions of
living wills, each expressing wishes about a certain kind of
treatment, and almost all of them directives indicating
preferences about types of treatment which patients consider
extraordinary or heroic.
The durable power of attorney is a kind of surrogate
directive, in which people give an agent power to make
health care decisions for them in situations when they are
incompetent. Wide support for both these forms of advanced
directive is evidenced by the fact that 42 states and the
District of Columbia have enacted living will
legislation.^^ A majority of states have enacted
legislation that allows individuals to execute a durable
power of attorney.^"* Also, there are evidences that both
living wills and durable power of attorney are readily
^^Terry A. Donner, "Living Wills and Power of Attorney,"
Dimension of Critical Care Nursing 10, no. 3 (May-June 1991):
S^ibid.
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available to the public. However, few people are
drafting living wills, durable power of attorney or other
advance directives. Congress passed an act to encourage
patients to complete advance directives. Starting December
1 this year in the United States, every health care facility
will be required (by the Patient Self-Determination Act) to
ask patients at admission if they have completed an advance
directive or if they would like further information about
them.^^ These two types of patient decision-making are
forms of informed consent and are based on a view of human
freedom in terms of autonomy and respect for persons.
2.3.2.2 Autonomy
Autonomy is the concept of a person as a responsible
decision-maker. This concept of a person places an
obligation on physicians and the health professionals to
respect the values of patients and not to impose their own
values about treatment on patients. Autonomy greatly
enlarges the kinds and numbers of choices available to human
beings. It allows individuals to choose almost everything,
including what they eat, where they live, where they work
and who will be their leaders. It exalts the notion that
individuals are absolutely free to make choices.
^^Ibid.
^^See The Patient Self Determination Act of 1991, U.S.
^"^A.R. Jonsen, M. Siegler, and W.J. Winsdale, Clinical Ethics
2nd ed., (New York: Macmillan, 1986).
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From what has been said about autonomy, it would seem
as if autonomy is self-determination: that is, the right to
autonomy is the right to make one's own choices, and that
respect for autonomy is the obligation not to interfere with
the choice of another and to treat another as a being
capable of choosing.^� However, the concept of autonomy
found in patient-based decisions has more than one meaning.
Several authors including Childress and Beauchamp have
counted at lest four senses for autonomy, implicit in
informed consent, living wills and durable powers of
attorney. In the first place, these procedures allow
patients to make decisions which are voluntary and
intentional. Autonomy is seen here as a free action.
Secondly, some patients have knowledge of the consequences
of foregoing life-support, have evaluated the options opened
to them, and have chosen based upon that evaluation. This
autonomy is effective deliberation. Thirdly, through these
procedures a person would be able to express his or her
'attitudes', 'values', dispositions and life plans. In the
event of the execution of such a procedure the action take
would be in conformity with them. Therefore, autonomy can
be seen here as a means of authenticity. Fourthly,
the procedure may present the opportunity for autonomy to be
^�Alan Donogan, The Theory of Morality (Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press, 1977) ; Ibid.
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"moral reflection". ^
The principle of autonomy has received much treatment
in the literature, and it has critics as well as proponents.
Callahan criticizes the principle of autonomy as being
minimalistic and egoistic in nature in its application in
the sociocultural context. ^� Childress, having reviewed
the charge levied by critics against it, makes a distinction
between the principle of autonomy and the principle of
respect for autonomy . ^-^ Speaking about his distinction he
says :
It is important to correct this mistake because many
critics seem to suppose that proponents of this
principle have an ideal of personal autonomy and believe
that we ought to be autonomous persons with autonomous
choices. However, the ideal of personal autonomy is
neither a pre-supposition nor an implication of the
principle of respect for personal autonomy, which
obligates us to respect the autonomous choices and
action of others.
He deals with the principle of respect for autonomy at
length, recognizing its scope, strengths and complexities.
He suggests that in making bioethical judgments we should
^^Bruce Miller, "Autonomy and the Refusal of Lifesaving
Treatment," Hastings Center Report, August 1981, 22-28.
^�Daniel Callahan, "Autonomy: A Moral Good, Not A Moral
Obsession," Hastings Center Report 14 (5): 40-42; Daniel Callahan,
"Fundamentalist Ethics," Hastings Center Report 11:5 (1981) , 29-15.
^�"�For a fuller treatment of "The Principle of Respect for
Autonomy, see Tom L. Beauchamp and James L. Childress Principles of
Biomedical Ethics, 3rd. ed. , (New York: Oxford University Press,
1989) , 67-119; James F. Childress "The Place of Autonomy in
Bioethics", Hastings Center Report 20 (1) Jan 1990, 12-17.
^^ibid.
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replace the principle of autonomy with the principle of
respect for autonomy. He is aware, however, that this
replacement will not solve the complex problems associated
with the application of the principle of autonomy involving
the ethical issues arising from the decision-making
processes .
^-^
The realizations that autonomy is limited and that
certain other principles besides autonomy are important in
moral decision-making lead us to think that perhaps we need
to appeal to tradition and philosophies, to find out what
principles should be included in solving those ethical
issues that arise in biomedical decision-making.
Furthermore, autonomy is a principled ethic, which derived
from the Greek auto (self) plus logos (law) . With autonomy
we become law to ourselves. Totally inconsistent to
Christian notion of freedom, we have to decide what is
right. Autonomy often conflicts with other principles like
beneficence, the right to life, justice and
confidentiality . Perhaps it is necessary to go beyond
these principles to find a moral theory that would enable us
to distinguish between passive euthanasia and legitimate
acts of foregoing life-support.
2.3.3.1 Substituted Judgment
^^Ibid.
^"^T. Beauchamp and J. Childress, 112.
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Many of the prominent court cases such as Quinlan,
Saikewicz and Brophy were decided using the substituted
judgment argument. Substituted judgment is a legal
concept, and it is based upon legal rights not to have
bodily integrity invaded, one's informed consent, and
constitutional rights of privacy. In practice, the
patient's will is not known, so the court tries to put
itself in the patient's place and figure out how the patient
would have decided. The doctrine of informed consent has
been discussed earlier, as has the notion of human freedom
upon which it is based.
2.3.3.2 Ordinary and Extraordinary Treatment
In some of the decisions such as Quinlan, the courts
recognized the distinction between ordinary and
extraordinary medical treatment. The logical first step may
be to show the distinction between ordinary and
extraordinary treatment. Robertson defines ordinary means
as all medicines, treatments and operations which offer a
reasonable hope of benefit and which can be obtained and
used without excessive expense, pain, or inconvenience. And
he defined extraordinary means as those medicines,
treatments and operations, which cannot be obtained or used
^^Charles L. Spring, "Changing Attitudes and Practices in
Forgoing Life-Sustaining Treatments," JAMA 263 (16), (April 25,
1990): 221-2215.
^^John D. Arras and Nancy Rhoden, Ethical Issues in Modern
Medicine (Mountain View California: Mayfield Publishing Co. , 1989) .
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without excessive exposure or pain or other conveniences of
which if used, would not offer a reasonable hope of
benefit. ^'^ Despite the fact that there has been a shift
in the types of medical treatment available, a consensus
still exists which maintains that the benefit and burden of
a treatment in the particular circumstances should play an
important role in the ordinary/extraordinary
distinction.^� This principle of comparing cost with
benefit is not unfamiliar to health professionals in their
day to day practice.
Therefore, in a case in which life-support will in fact
entail excessive expense or pain and there is no reasonable
hope of benefit, then the life-support may be withdrawn.
However, if the life-support involves no excessive pain, and
a reasonable hope of the benefit from it exists, then its
withdrawal may be seen as intending to commit homicide.
In Quinlan, the courts recognized that mechanical
ventilation was an extra-ordinary treatment. However, even
after her life-support systems were removed in 1975 and she
^^Ibid.
^�Thompson Mason Fuller, "Means of Prolonging Life" in James
Bopp, ed. , Human Life and Health Care Ethics, vol. 2 (Maryland:
University Publications of America, Inc.), 224-239; Ibid.
^^John D. Arras and Nancy Rhoden, Ethical Issues in Modern
Medicine .
^�Robert N. Wennberg, Terminal Choices: Euthanasia. Suicide
and the Right to Die (Michigan: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co. ,
1989) : 108-156.
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did not die, she continued to be provided with hydration and
nourishment. Many physicians, along with others, believe
that basic, humane care requires that patients always be
given food and water. However, there is an intensive
debate over whether artificial nutrition and hydration may
be classified as medical treatment and also be discontinued
if futile or burdensome. Some have tried to distinguish
between forms of artificial feeding: intravenous feeding is
a common procedure in hospitals, and nasogastric feeding is
considered by some as an extraordinary procedure. The
courts recently seemed to be abandoning not only the
traditional view that food and water are not medical
treatment but also the distinction between ordinary and
extraordinary treatment. Several courts have allowed
the withdrawal of food and fluids from incompetent patients
based upon substituted judgment. ^"^
2.4 Conclusion
Human freedom, suffering and death are central concepts
in decisions to withhold and withdraw life support from
^�"�Ibid. , 164. For fuller treatment ofthis argument, see
Mellander, "On Removing Food and Water: Against the Stream,"
Hastings Center Report (December 1984), 11.
^^Marcia Angell, "Prisoner of Technology: The Case of Nancy
Cuzan", The New England Journal of Medicine 332 (26 April 1990):
1226 (3) .
-^Lawrence J. Schneiderman and Roger C. Spragg, "Treatment for
Old People and People with Disabilities: 1987 Developments", Issues
of Law and Medicine 3 (Spring 1988): 333-360.
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critically-ill patients. However, these concepts enter
decisions by way of certain moral principles and
definitions: autonomy, quality of life, and brain death.
It seems as if current decisions ar not made within the
context of a moral theory. Rather, certain principles
formed the theoretical basis upon which they are made.
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CHAPTER 3
CONCEPTION OF HUMAN FREEDOM, SUFFERING AND DEATH IN THE
PHILOSOPHY OF FREDERICK NIETZSCHE AND IN
THE THEOLOGY OF THE APOSTLE PAUL
3 . 1 Introduction
My thesis is that a philosophical and biblical analysis
of the formal structure of human freedom, suffering and
death can provide an essential foundation for determining
the ethical dimensions of whether it is justifiable to
withdraw or withhold systems of life-support.
My argument is directed toward the following point: in
the context of current decision-making practice, the problem
of human freedom, suffering and death have not been answered
within a single philosophical background, and the manner in
which decisions are currently made proves inappropriate as a
framework for making such decisions, especially for
Christians .
But the care of critically-ill patients necessitates a
philosophic and transcendent basis, without which
unacceptable patterns of practice may develop/ or in the
unacceptable decision-making may develop.
Also, a systematic theology/biblical interpretation of
human freedom, suffering and death should reform the ways in
which decisions to forgo life-support are presently being
made. It would enable patient or proxy to decide each case,
not on the basis of individualism or utilitarianism but with
theological/biblical principle consonant with Christian
beliefs. The potential value of Christian beliefs for this
particular bioethical problem is the provision of meaning to
the experiences of human freedom, suffering and death.
However, the task is to provide suggestions of ultimate
meaning and purpose not bound by tradition or denomination,
for human freedom, suffering and death. With this
proposition in mind, we shall narrow our investigation into
theology only to the Pauline Corpus in the Bible.
In this chapter we shall examine the conceptions of
freedom, suffering and death of the philosopher Frederick
Nietzsche and the apostle Paul, to see what contrasting
meanings they assign to these concepts from the standpoint
of their anti- and pro-Christian perspectives, respectively -
3.2 Human Freedom. Suffering and Death
in the Thoughts of Frederick Nietzsche
3.2.1 Biographical Background
Students of philosophy have interpreted Nietzsche from
various perspectives. In order to be able to understand his
conceptions on human freedom, suffering and death, a brief
summary of his philosophical thoughts should be made. After
presenting a brief biographical sketch of Nietzsche, we
shall discuss briefly his views on rationality and
knowledge, his world-view and his concept of life.
Thereafter, we will interpret Nietzsche's conception of
human freedom, suffering and death within this framework.
According to Lawton, Nietzsche credits his philosophy
to his long sickness, and he states that Nietzsche calls
this period "the teacher of great suspicion".^ Considering
the related concepts of "will to power" and "eternal return"
in the light of his concepts of sickness and health, Lawton
contends that Nietzsche's philosophy is a reflection of his
experiences during his long sickness and his intention to be
well.^ Lawton quotes Nietzsche as follows: "I turned my
will to health, life into a philosophy."-^ Indeed Frederick
Nietzsche was ill for many years of his adult life. Born in
Rochen, Prussia, in 1844, Frederick Wilhelm was the son of
Lutheran minister. At the age of 14, he went to boarding
school near Naumburg. He was a brilliant student, always at
the top of his class. Nietzsche studied theology and
classical philosophy at the German universities of Bonn and
Leipzig. It was during his time at Leipzig University that
Nietzsche discovered the philosophy of the philosopher
Schopenhauer and the music of the musician Richard Wagner.
�"�Phillip N. Lawton, Nietzsche Convalescence Philosophy
Research Archives, vol. XIII (1987-88), 152.
^Lawton, p. 151-154.
�^Lawton, p. 160.
They were later to influence his philosophical thoughts.
Perhaps a significant event in Nietzsche's life did occur
while he served his miliary service. In March of 1868 he
fell from a horse and hurt himself badly. He suffered
gravely from this injury, and it ended his military career.
This accident will later result in his poor health.
Nietzsche became a professor at the age of 24. He taught at
Leipzig in Germany and Basel University in Switzerland. His
works include The Birth of Tragedy 1872, Human, All-too-
Human 1878, The Dawn 1881, The Gray Science 1882, Thus Spake
Zarathrustra . Bevond Good and Evil 1886, Towards a Genealogy
of Morals 1887. Numerous other books were written by him.
An important book. The Will to Power consists of some of the
notes Nietzsche accumulated from 1884 to 1888. It was
published by his sister Elizabeth Foster-Nietzsche after the
philosopher's death.
^
3.2.2 Philosophical Method
No one method dominates philosophical analysis.
Rather, many forms of critical methods are pervasive.^
Mclntyre identifies three methods in philosophical ethics
"^This brief biography of Frederick Nietzsche was made out from
materials taken from "Chronology", p. 20-23, in Walter Kaufmann's
The Portable Nietzsche. 1954: The Viking Press.
^Alasdair Maclntyre, Three Rival Versions of Moral
Enquiry: Encyclopedia of Genealogy and Tradition (Notre Dame,
Indiana: University of Notre Dame, 1990), 32-57.
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which he calls "three rival versions of moral inquiry".^
They are encyclopedia, genealogy and tradition. Nietzsche
adopted the genealogical method in his attempt to show the
inadequacy of traditional metaphysics.^ Hoy presents a
beautiful description of the genealogical method:
"Genealogy tends to find an incoherence in our self-
understanding (for instance, between our various self-
descriptions, or between the way we think and the way we
act) and then to show how that incoherence is produced from
within us. Rather than confirm the adequacy of our present
self -descriptions and the coherence of our practices,
genealogy makes us more intelligible to ourselves by showing
us the inadequacy of our present self -understandings and
practices, and then giving an interpretation of how such an
inadequacy could have come about"� Hoy contends that it
had serious implications on Nietzsche's conceptions of the
relationship between reality and reason.^ Traditional
rational inquiry had postulated that all reality could be
^Ibid.
"^Ibid., 32-57.
�David C. Hoy, Nietzsche, Hume and the Geneaological Method in
Yirmiyahi Yovel ed. Nietzsche as Affirmative Thinker
(Massachusetts: Kliver Academy Publishers, 1986), 20-38.
^Ibid.
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grasped through reason. Using genealogical analysis to
refute this assertion, Nietzsche condemns endeavors to grasp
reality through reason. In his opinion they misrepresent
reality by imposing a certain perspective upon it.-^-"- An
adequate philosophy, Nietzsche thought, should be able to
reveal life from various perspectives. In essence,
Nietzsche is saying that truth can be comprehended from
various points of view.-"^^ This leaves us with the notion
that "there is no such thing as truth as such, but only
truth from one or another point of view" . Many commentators
have questioned whether Nietzsche held to this
multiciplicity of perspective viewpoint . -^-^ Not only did
Nietzsche turn aside from traditional physical methods, he
also criticized traditional world-views. He rejected the
idea that everything in the world had been designed by God
to be of service to man. One who refutes God as the creator
and sustainer of life on earth has only to turn to
evolution. Nietzsche saw more essence in the theory of
evolution than Darwin. Darwinism presented a world
wherein individual organisms struggle for their existence.
l�Ibid.
i^Ibid.
^^Alasdir, Maclntyre, Three Rival Versions of Moral Enairv.
32-57 .
l^Ibid.
^'*Rose Pfeffer, Nietzsche: Disciple of Dionysus, (Lewisburg:
Bucknell University Press, 1972), 155-158.
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But in this struggle human beings and other living organisms
remain passive to the dictates of the environment. They
only try to adapt to it.-"-^
Living organisms perform yet another superior role in
the Nietzschean world than only to struggle for their
existence. They also have the desire to dominate the
environment in which they live.-"-^ This violation to
dominate, Nietzsche described as an aggressive "will to
power". Despite this added dimension, the Nietzschean
world is totally anti-theological. According to his views,
the universe is in chaos. But what makes Nietzsche's
conceptions unique from other evolutionary theory is the
notion we find expressed in the will to war, a will to power
and a will to overpower .
�'�^ When speaking about life,
Nietzsche presents two unique imports. Firstly life finds
expression in the will to power. Secondly, life is made up
^^Ibid.; Warren D. Allmon, "What Does It All Mean - The
Individual in Darwin's World", Earth Science. (Spring 1990), 38.
�'�^Frederick Nietzsche, The Will to Power trans, by Walter
Kaufmann and R.J. Holingdale, (New York: Random House, 1967), 218.
^"^Rose Pfeffer, 155-158.
^�Ibid. ; Robert Nola, "Nietzsche's Theory of Truth and
Belief," Philosophy and Phenomonoloqical Research, vol. XLVII, no.
4, (June 1987), 525-562.
of a set of forces, both psychic and biological . �'�^ The
question of meaning comes up in our minds after we capture
Nietzsche's view of life. For many of us, it is difficult
to appropriate meaning to life so defined. With life as
defined in terms of biological and psychic forces and a
world view which does not uphold any notion of the
transcendent, human life would be devoid of meaning. Man
becomes an immanent being who has no supernatural gifts or
obligations. 20 He is self-sufficient, and he lacks
nothing residing in a superior world. 2�'�
3.2.3 Human Freedom
Woodward advanced the thesis that Nietzsche's
philosophy exhibits an "internal consistency" which could be
untangled only by putting together Nietzsche's concept of
freedom. True indeed, without any understanding of his
concept of freedom, almost all of his works will be
�"�^Ibid. ; Paul D. Maclean, "Brain roots of the Will-to-Power
Zygon," Journal of Science and Religion, vol. 18, (Dec, 1983), 359-
374 .
2�Frederick Nietzsche, Genealogy of Morals trans, by Walter
Kaufmann and R.J. Holingdale (New York: Vintage Books, 1967) , 24-
96.
2llbid.
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meaningless. Woodward makes this assertion also.^^ In
fact, his concept of freedom is tied up with most of the
important concepts he elucidated: the revaluation of values,
the will to power, eternal rebirth and the Overman.
Of these, there exists a serious link between the
concept of freedom and the Overman. Before we proceed
any further, let us give a brief description of how
Nietzsche perceived the Overman. Bernd Magnus presented a
brief description of how Nietzsche perceived the Overman:
"The Overman represents Nietzsche's nondualistic vision
of human perfection. Like Goethe, the Overman is the
Dionysian who has overcome his animal nature, has
sublimated his impulses, organized the chaos of his
passions, lives authentically, and has given style to
his character. He is a free human being, joyous,
without the master of instructional drives which do not
overpower him. He represents the ascending life, self-
overcoming and self-possession. In him intelligence,
strength of character and will, autonomy, passion and
taste are fully integrated. Think of him as Christ's
soul in Caesar's body, or as instinct
spiritualized. "^^
From the description of the Overman we make the
following observation. Nietzsche approached the concept of
freedom from an existential perspective. Such a perspective
focuses on selfhood and self-realization. According to him,
freedom exists for the sake of self-realization. The moral
^^Charles Dale Woodward, "Freedom, The Overman, and Style in
Nietzsche's Philosophy (Unpublished diss. University of California
[abstract] ) .
23ibid.
^'^Bernd Magnus, "Nietzsche, Hume and the Genealogical Method"
in Yirmiyahu Yovel ed. Nietzsche as Affirmative Thinker (Boston:
Kulver Academic Group, 1986), 20-38.
57
task for each person often is to attain authentic selfhood
in freedom. To understand his concept of freedom better,
let us look into the traditional metaphysical conceptions of
selfhood and self-realization. The traditional view puts
man's inner being dressed in encasements. Selfhood is
described as that state of full awareness and ultimate self.
However, to attain this state, man has to cast aside those
encasements.^^ This process which corresponds to a
reversal of the creation, is possibly only through spiritual
discipline. Attained it helps man to possess a more
profound relationship with the universe. This view has
a science of the universe and of human beings which follows
from the hierarchial notion of both the inner being of human
beings and the universe.^� In the traditional view the
self has a metaphysical rather than a physical basis.
It invites a contrast between the self and the body. And
the body is thought of as weighing down, impeding and
limiting the true self. The self yearns for its freedom.
^^Masterpieces of World Philosophy in summary form, 1961 ed.
"Plato Phaedo".
^^Ibid.
^�^Ibid.
^�Ibid. For a fuller treatment of Plato's Cosmology and
Psychology, see Francis Macdonald Cornford's Plato
' s Cosmology a
translation of "The Timaeus". (London:, 1948).
29ibid.
3�Ibid.
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Nietzsche is an opponent of the notion of the
metaphysical self. Individuals, not God, are the source of
meaning. Life is what the will to power makes it. Stability
is what we put into the world and not what we find there.
Because there are no substances, no continuing entities,
there are no selves and no god, and even the idea of an
individual seems hard to sustain.
The human body is the best picture of the human
soul. The metaphysical self becomes the physical
self.^-^ The physical self in its strife for selfhood is
involved in a quest for wholeness.^'* An illustration of
this urge is found in one of the main themes in his
philosophy, namely the revaluation of values. Nietzsche
intends to stimulate his audience to create their own
values. Through the process of reevaluation individuals
come to find self -integration. They do so by affirming and
acknowledging contradictions which exist in human nature.
�^�'�Frederick Nietzsche, "Thus Spake Zarathrustra" in The
Profitable Nietzsche, trans. Walter Kaufmann, (New York: Penguin
Books, 1968), 146.
^^ibid.
^^Ibid.
�^"^Frederick Nietzsche, "The Transvaluation of Values.
Selections from The Will to Power, The Genealogy of Morals (first
essay) and Beyond Good and Evil" in Ethel M. Albert, Theodore L.
Denise and Sheldon P. Peterfreund Great Traditions in Ethics 3rd.
ed. (New York: D. Von Notrand Co), 253-278.
^^Ibid.
3^Ibid.
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Human nature is both rational and irrational, good and
evil.-^' It is by embracing both opposing qualities of
human nature that we become whole. ^� Becoming whole means
becoming a new creature with a higher level of spiritual and
moral consciousness. We then participate both in the
conscious and in the unconscious. Nietzsche calls this new
personality "the higher self".^^
The concept of the higher man is demonstrated in Book
IV of Zarathrustra. Zarathrustra searches in solitude for
his instinctual "self" from which to control. Once in
possession of himself, he affirms oneness with the world by
zeroing on life as part of a whole. Zarathrustra comes back
to an image created by Nietzsche earlier found in his other
works "the free spirit". ^�
From Nietzsche relevant themes of "reevaluation of
values", "eternal return" and for the images of the "higher
^�^Ibid.
^�Ibid.
^^Gilles Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, trans, by Hugh
Tomlinson (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983) , 164-171;
Kathleen Marie Higgin, Nietzsche's Zarathrustra (Philadelphia:
Temple University Press, 1987), 203-232; Howard A. Slaatte, A
Critical Survey of Ethics (New York: University Press of America,
1988), 209-
"^^Eugen Biser, "The Scales of the Spirit" in Nietzsche's
"Battle with the Spirit of Gravity" in Theology of Joy Johannes B.
Metz, Jean P- Jossua ed. (Herder and Herder, 1974); Frederick
Nietzsche, Bevond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the
Future (1886) trans, by Walter Kaufmann (New York: Random House,
1967) .
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man" and "free spirits", we undertake to formulate his
concept of freedom, suffering and death. Freedom is the
sense of a release from all moorings and ties and an
acceptance of the libertine principle. Conceived as a great
emancipation, freedom is understood as absolute self-
determination .
By freedom, Nietzsche meant that an individual is able
to create his or her own values. It means the "realization
of man's authentic being. ""^^ And this freedom is achieved
through education.'*-^ What renders an individual act free
is the existential commitment or the personalization of
experience. That is, the act is free when it springs from
the whole personality.'*'^
Like other philosophers devoted to existentialism,
Nietzsche believes that the possibility of choice is the
central fact to human nature.'*^ By that he maintained
that human beings do not have fixed natures which limit or
determine their choices. Rather, it is their choices that
^�^Shlomo Pines, "Nietzsche: Psychology of Philosophy and
Freedom" in Yirmiyahu Yovel ed. , Nietzsche as Affirmative Thinker
(Massachustts : Kulmer Academic Press, 1983), 147-159.
"^^Eliyahn Rosenow, "Nietzsche's Concept of Education" in Y.
Yovel (ed.) Nietzsche as Affirmative Thinker. 127.
"^^Ibid., 119-131.
^"^Jacob Golomb, "Nietzsch on Authenticity" Philosophy Today 34
(Fall 1996) , 243-258.
45lbid.
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brings whatever nature they have into being. This implies
three things: (1) all actions imply choices, (2) although
in many of our actions our choices are governed by criteria,
the criteria which we employ are themselves chosen, and
there are no rational grounds for such choices, (3) we
cannot give any explanation for our actions.'*^
3.2.4 Death
Emanating from his thoughts on human freedom is his
conception of death. It is an existential view of death.
It could also be described as an nontranscedental view of
death. Nietzsche's thoughts on Death appear in part one
of Zarathrustra and the Twilight of the Idols. ^�
Undoubtedly, Nietzsche's ideas on death are influenced by
Karl Jaspers.
A review of the traditional non-existentialist view
will aid us to understand Nietzsche's views. The
traditional view is seen in Plato Phaedo. In it death is an
event which brings about a separation of body and soul. The
soul, as mentioned earlier, is that it survives after death
of the body. The traditional view treats death and life as
"^^Helmut Thielicke, Living with Death trans, by Geoffrey W.
Browley (Michigan: William B. Eerdman Publishing Company, 1983) .
47ibid.
'*�A fuller treatment on Nietzsche's view of death and its
connections with his doctrine of Eternal Recurrence is found in
George T. Stack, "Eternal Recurrence Again,
" Philosophy Today, vol.
28 (198), 242-264.
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mutually exclusive opposites. Life is the opposite to
death. Thielicke noted the ramifications of this view
of death. "It divides human beings into an authentic part
which is an immortal substance that survives death, and an
inauthentic part which is an unimportant vessel for that
substance which can and should perish. "^� Death in the
traditional view means death of our inauthentic part and
freedom for authentic existence. And death in the
traditional sense suggests a radical incompleteness of
philosophy of the person. This dualistic splitting of
the human personality which is found in the traditional
definition of death is nowhere to be found in Nietzsche.
On the contrary, Nietzsche sees death as a limitation to
freedom. Wholeness of person is one of the hidden unity and
destiny of the personality. In Nietzsche there are two
possibilities of living: either as an authentic existence
using heideggerian terms, in which the individual faces the
limits of human existence and especially in his death, or
"^^Masterpieces and world philosophy in summary form, "Plato
Phaedo", 81-87; Helmut Thielicke, Living with Death trans, by
Geoffrey W. Bromley (Grand Rapids: 1983), 63-69.
^�Helmut Thielicke, Living with Death, trans, by Geoffrey W.
Bromley (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1983),
63-69.
^^Henry Staten, Nietzsche's Voice. (Ithica: Cornell University
Press 1990), 114; Helmut Thelicke, Living with Death trans, by
Geoffrey W. Bromley (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing
Co., 1983), 63-69.
52ibid., 126.
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the inauthentic existence, in which the individual retreats
from death and the of the world and becomes their
victim. ^-^ Freedom is expressed in the sense that we have
power to choose between authentic and inauthentic
existence.^"* This connection between death and human
freedom can have two consequences. Since we are free to
choose the type of life we live, we cannot choose to
continue to sustain our life indefinitely.^^ Death
becomes a limitation to human freedom. Thereby who
accepts death as part of living. Helmut Thielicke observes
this in his description of the Nietzschean concepts of death
as nontranscendental . He commented that this view saw death
as part of life and therefore death is an end that comes
from within and not from without. If we reflect on
Nietzsche's immanentistic world-view, and also on the idea
that the authentic being must be able to grasp the opposite
aspects of human nature. Then we see that death is not
^�^Helmut Thelicke, Living with Death trans, by Geoffrey W.
Bromley (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1983), 63-
69; Ibid.
^"^Ibid.
^^Ibid.
^^Henry Staten, 74-75; Helmut Thielicke, Living With Death
trans, by Geoffrey W. Bromley (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans
Publishing Co., 1983), 63-69.
^^Helmut Thielicke, Living with Death; Sarah Kaufman Baubo,
"Theological Pervision and Fetishism" in Michael Allen Gillespie
and Tracy B. Strong Nietzschens New Seas (The University of Chicago
Press, 1988) .
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remote or detachable from life; death is pervasive, and
abiding and as present as life itself.^� We are able to
view death in the total context of shared human existence.
It is a view that seems to say that man is capable of coping
with death. It offers people to approach death in
equanimity. This courage in the face of death can be
achieved by living authentically. Helmut Thielicke accuses
Nietzsche conceptions to be the closest to modern
biologism.^� Nietzsche argues that though man's mortality
is of greatest importance for any philosophy of life, the
importance of dying is not.^-'- In his view the will to die
can be countered by the affirmation of life in art and by
the heroic acceptance of "external recurrence" .
3.2.5 Suffering
The philosopher has made many allusions to sickness.
For he views sickness as an organic, but dysfunctional
state. According to him then, the dilemma of sickness
is internal and the means for curing it must be brought out
^"ibid.
^^Ibid.
^�Ibid.
^^Ibid.
^^Lawrence Lampert, Nietzsche's Teachings (New Haven: Yale
University Press), 221-223, 237-240.
^-^An example is found in Frederick Nietzsche, On the Genealogy
of Morals in Basic Workings of Nietzsche.
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from within the human situation. * However, despite its
central character, sickness has the power to debilitate
anyone, even the strongest person. It is within the context
of his thoughts on sickness and the nature of human life
that Nietzsche expressed his general concern for human
suffering. A perusal of Nietzsche's work it became
apparent that he distinguished between various kinds of
suffering. Viewing suffering from the perspective of those
who bear pain, Nietzsche was able to make a split between
"suffering from superabundance of life" and "suffering from
the impoverishment of life".^^ By the former Nietzsche
made reference to those who use suffering creatively and
positively. The later he referred to those who have a
negative view of life in the event of suffering. From
the perspective of character aspects of suffering Nietzsche
differentiated between minor sufferings similar to emotional
hurts and serious suffering similar to severe grief. He did
not concern himself with minor sufferings but with the
severe suffering type.^� Severe suffering involves actual
life events. A perfect example could be pain and grief
^"^Ibid.
^^Ibid.
^^Gilles Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy trans, by Hugh
Tomlinson (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), 16-17.
^�^Ibid., 16-17, 19-24.
6�Ibid., 16-17, 19-24.
suffered by a mother who loses a son to a stray bullet in a
store robbery. She cannot reduce her pain by thinking
through the shooting event. Rather, she might increase her
pain if she does.^^ Events similar to this happen too
many times in our lives. They are terrible events. In
Birth of Tragedy and in Zarathrustra. Nietzsche dealt with
it in depth. Based upon his studies of the ancient Greeks,
he adopted a triad of metaphors to illustrate three
different procedures to cope with severe suffering or
tragedy. Relevant to us are the allusions to severe
suffering which the philosopher makes. He cautioned those
who want to make sense out of situations of severe
suffering, that severe suffering can be rationalized . ^�
This comes out in Nietzsche again that human beings are
imaginative, intelligent, sensual beings, to whom peace in
life and death, could come only if they understood and
master their essential human emotions. So he recommends
that suffering should be treated by applying to one's
emotions. To be more specific to the concerns of this
�^Kathlee Marie Higgins, Nietzsche's Zarathrustra
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1987), 16-39-
�^^Ibid.
�^^Ibid.
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study, Nietzsche would recommend that the seriously ill
should desire to share their thoughts and feelings about
their illnesses and other related matters. Onlookers should
allow them to do so. The onlooker must be prepared to deal
with the suffering with openness and accommodation. A
purely existentialist position, Nietzsche's, it seems, was
one that treated suffering as a force without and beyond
reason. Suffering is one of life's paradoxes, a basic
condition of existence.
Permit me to give a concise summary of Nietzsche's
conception of suffering: suffering undermines the human
condition, but it is very useful. Suffering is a way of
life because it has the potential to reveal life to those
who go through it. Suffering is also useful because it
unveils truth and shows one's true colors. Suffering is
life-preserving, mind quickening and soul testing.
3.3 Human Freedom. Suffering
and Death in Paul
We now turn to define the concepts of human freedom,
suffering and death set by Paul. However, because of the
expanse of Paul's writings, we will do our analysis based
upon selections from his writings. We are relying on the
scholarship of authorities in that field of New Testament.
We start this analysis with insights from Paul's view of
Ibid.
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human beings and the world. The early church fathers
interpreted Pauline anthropology within the framework of
Greek philosophy . Greek philosophy differentiated
between two existing worlds: this world and the other
world. It also had a dualistic view of human beings: the
soul and the body."^** Consequently, the Patristic fathers
interpreted Pauline anthropology in primarily dualistic
terms. "^^ Not satisfied with this interpretation, recent
scholars of the New Testament sought to reject the
Hellenistic framework within which Paul's views were
interpreted.^^ Rather than the Patristic fathers
dualistic understanding, recent scholars have suggested that
Pauline views of man must be understood from Rabbinic
framework. Using Judiastic presuppositions to interpret
Paul, they came up with a monistic interpretation of Pauline
anthropology. Their moves did not settle the questions we
face in reading Paul's views. It is our opinion that
Pauline anthropology is neither purely dualistic nor purely
"^^Laeuchi, Monism and Dualism in Pauline Anthropology,
Biblical Research 3: (1958), 15-27; George Eldon Ladd, A Theology
of the New Testament (Wm. B. Eerdman's Publishing Co., 1974), 364-
407.
�^^Ibid.
''^Ibid.
�^^Ibid.
�^�^Ibid.
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monistic.^� Totally in agreement with those scholars who
believe that it should be interpreted "in medias res" that
is, taken to the midpoint. Paul shows both elements of
monism and dualism in expounding his views of human
beings. �� Therefore, we can say that his views were
pluralistic. �-'- But as those who have taken this position
warned, it is not the pluralism of Paul's ideas which form
the basis for his anthropology, rather it is his theological
concern.
�2 paul was concerned to show that the new self
is different from the old natural body. In the chapter "Man
Outside of Christ" of the book A Theology of the New
Testament, George Eldon Ladd gave insights into Pauline
views of the world and man. His thesis is that Pauline
views should be understood against the background of
"eschatalogical dualism."�^ Paul adopted the two ages
scheme of time from Judaism: this age and the age to come.
In addition, Ladd cites that Paul has a unique attitude
toward the natural world. To Paul, the natural world
illustrates the character and power of Almighty God. Not
�^�Ibid.
79ibid.
soibid.
s^lbid.
�2ibid.
�^George Elden Ladd, A Theology of the New Testament
(Michigan: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1974), 396.
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only has God created the natural world, including all that
is with it, he created it out of nothing, through
Christ.�^ However, Paul explains that creation is no
longer in that state in which it was created. Creation has
fallen, and it is in need of redemption. Paul wrote about
orders of other created beings: angelic beings and demons.
And Ladd pointed out that these were not "peripheral"
elements or "the result of the influence of extraneous
religions concepts upon his views". �^ The Pauline world
is different from the Nietzschean world.
3.3.1 Paul on Freedom
According to Robert Adams, Pauline freedom is a
characteristic of a wider ethical system of "divine
commands". But it is also a dynamic model, "a conception of
the subjective freedom with which a person ought to respond
to life's occasions". He maintains that the two sides
should remain undiscerptible . �^ Richardson's book Paul
Ethics of Freedom serves a primer where these two sides are
brought out. In some parts of the book Richardson seemed to
say that freedom excludes all principles except for its
evangelical goals. At other times it seems that freedom is
s^ibid.
�^Ibid., 403.
�^Robert M. Adams, "Christian Liberty" in Thomas V. Morris
ed. , Philosophy and the Christian Faith (Notre Dame: University of
Notre Dame Press, 1988), 151-171.
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subject to all sorts of limits. These include love, the law
of Christ, and the content of the gospel, and the Roman
rule. With regard to the first side, human actions are free
if they are voluntary.�^ Paul rules out even the
slightest presence of coercion in a free action.��
Irrelevant whether good or evil results from an action, it
is morally improper to pressure someone into an action.�^
Having ruled out compulsion, Paul agrees that actions that
are moral are those made by free choices of the agent.
They must proceed from the heart of the agent. But Paul
speaks of a further condition necessary to make a free
action morally appropriate. An agent who makes an action
must have inner control over his or her desires, and a
constant motive, to be able to do a right action.
Because of this, it is usual for scholars to interpret the
Pauline concept of freedom in terms of utilitarian,
consequential thinking. they see autonomy in Paul's
concept of freedom, especially where Paul in I Corinthians
Chapter 10, verse 2 3 said: "Everything is permitted, but not
^'^Peter Richardson, Paul's Ethics of Freedom. 1st ed. ,
(Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1979) .
��Ibid.
�5lbid.
90lbid.
91ibid.
92ibid.
everything is helpful. "^-^ Robert Adams proposes an
interpretation of Pauline concept of freedom, in which he
says that the Christian is forced from deontology for a
teleological ethics.^'* This brings out the second side of
Paul's concept of freedom: Paul's freedom is bounded up in
an ethical system of divine commands. First of all, we have
to distinguish Paul ' s ideas of freedom from the Greek notion
of freedom which is autonomy. The concept of autonomy
mentioned earlier empowers an agent to make a choice freely
of any external coercion and from any constraint
whatever. John Kilner notes that Paul does not conceive
freedom as autonomy. Paul's concept of freedom does not
allow one to do whatever he or she wants. Rather, it
recognizes that the decision-maker faces certain realities
within which he or she must make a decision. Consequently,
if the decision-maker ignores the reality within which the
decision must be made, then he or she will be wrong.
Kilner maintains that within the Pauline ethic the decision
maker has the freedom to be wrong. However, he believes
that such freedom will not make a "reality-contradiction"
^^Robert M. Adams, "Christian Liberty", 155.
54ibid.
^^Ibid., 155-156.
^^Kilner, John F. , "A Pauline Approach to Ethical Decision-
Making", Interpretation: A Journal of Bible and Theology 43
(October, 1989): 366-379.
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action ethically justifiable.^''
3.3.2 Paul on Death
Like Nietzsche whose ideas on suffering and death are
influenced by his own long illness, so also are Paul's
ideas. They were conceived based upon his reflections on
his own suffering and the suffering and death of his master
98Jesus. In the first chapter of the second letter to the
Corinthians, Paul's experience of death is like Jesus.
He is being pursued into death by his own people. In the
fifth verse he mentioned that the suffering of the Messiah
flows over into his life.^�� French theologian and
scholar Xavier Leon-Dufour captures Paul's experiences of
death in his book Face a la Mort Jesus et Paul.^�^ In the
second section, Leon-Dufour focuses on Paul facing Jesus on
the cross and Paul facing his own death. He carefully
analyzed those terms used by Paul in his death discourse.
The author claims that Paul interprets Christ's death as a
victory over death. -"-^^
57ibid.
^�Xavier Leon-Dufor, Life and Death in the New Testament: The
Teachings of Jesus and Paul (Face a la Mort Jesus et Paul) , trans.
Terence Pendergast, (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1986), 153-286.
99ibid.
lOOlbid.
loilbid.
I02ibid.
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We come to discuss Paul's view of his death. We
confine ourselves to his letters to the Romans and the
Corinthians and will rely upon the scholarship of
authorities in the New Testament Studies. Confident
that these authors have done good work analyzing Paul's view
of death, in this analysis we shall only examine those
relationships which are implied in death. Paul speaks of
death in terms of a personal relationship, a relationship
with God and with the world. Paul asserts that the "wages
of sin is death. "^�"* He tells us that, "sin came into
this world through one man and death through one, and so
death spread to all men because all men sinned. "-^^^
Narratives in another portion of his epistles show that Adam
was the first man who caused sin, and he expounded on the
content of the original sin. So death became a punishment
for sin.-'-^^ For the sin which Adam committed was grave.
The result is the loss of both "physical corporeality" and
"earthly corporateness" . These losses involve a present
process which is unchallenged.
�'�^^ When we view death as
^O^C. Clifton Black, "Pauline Perspectives on Death in Romans
5-8", Journal of Biblical Literature 3, (September 1984): 413-433.
lO'^See Romans 6:23, NIV.
l�^See Romans 5:12-14, NIV.
I06j^urray J. Haris, "Paul's View of Death in 2 Corinthians 5:1-
10" in Richard N. Longenecker and Merrill C. Tenney, eds. , New
Dimensions in New Testament Study (Grand Rapids: Zondervan
Publishing House, 1974).
lO^Ibid.
the result of sin, then death becomes more than a natural
event. It becomes an event that individuals have caused for
themselves. For this perspective, human beings are no
longer objects in the path of death but they become
subjects. Death becomes an event in which we
participate as responsible persons. It becomes an
event which individual persons have caused for
themselves . �^�^^
Not only does the Pauline concept of death establish a
personal experience of death, it also establishes a
relationship between the deceased and the transcendent
world. The loss of "physical corporeality" and earthly
corporateness does not end life, but death ushers into the
after life. �'��^�^ Murray Harris had this to say about this
relationship: "Death allows 'in Christ' corporeality to
achieve its goals in consummated 'with Christ' fellowship.
Death may terminate the pilgrimage of faults but inaugurates
the beatific viso Christi . . . . �'��'�^ Thus we notice here two
sides to death: as a punishment for sins and ushering us
into a new relationship with God. However, when we consider
death as a punishment for sin, we should always remember
^��Ibid.
lo^ibid.
iiOibid.
^Ibid.
ii^ibid.
that Christ's death is a substituted atonement for our
sins. This link, our sins and Christ's death makes the
Pauline view of death inseparable with his view of
resurrection. 1^'* So, Paul believes that the power of
death has been drawn by Christ's conquest over death. �'��'�^
Summarizing Paul's view of death, our attention is
drawn to the two faces of death. On one hand, death seems
to initiate a positive relationship between God and a
Christian believer. On the other hand, death brings human
beings to our closest experience of the Wrath of God.
Furthermore, we discovered that death in Pauline writings
means more than a natural phenomena. It incorporates the
relational aspect of human life.
3.3.3 Paul on Suffering
It is very difficult to seek to say something within a
small scope about Paul's thought on any matters. Of course,
it is more difficult when it involves one of the central
themes of his epistles: suffering. In doing so, we have to
understand those assumptions under which Paul expounded on
suffering: first, Paul speaks of suffering from his own
experience. �'��'�^ Second, he assumes that God shares in
li^Ibid.
ii^ibid.
ii^Ibid.
^^^1 Corinthians 4.
human sufferings . ^^"^ Third, Paul views the whole of
creation as subjected to futility.
After a careful study of Pauline corpus, we discovered
three types of human suffering. The first kind is personal
suffering. It occurs when an individual person comes to
terms with his or her own human finitude and
limitations. The second type we call "suffering at the
hands of human injustice", and the third type "suffering at
the hands of the power of death". ^^o p^j, ^-^^ practical
purposes, we shall consider only suffering at the hands of
the power of death.
We start the analysis by pointing to Paul's attitude to
this type of suffering. He was realistic about it.
�'�^Consider that our present sufferings are not worth
comparing with the glory that will be revealed in us.
^^The creation waits in eager expectation for the sons
of God to be revealed. ^^For the creation was subjected
to frustration, not by its own choice, but by the will
of the one who subjected it, in hope ^^that the creation
itself will be liberated from its bondage to decay and
brought into the glorious freedom of the children of
God.
22we know that the whole creation has been groaning
as in the pains of childbirth right up to the present
'Joseph Blenkinsop, "We Rejoice in Our Sufferings," in
Michael J. Taylor S.J. ed. The Mystery of Suffering and Death (New
York: Abba House, 1973), 47-55.
^^�G.E. Ladd, 397, c.f. Romans 8:20.
�^�'^^Joseph Blenkinsop, "We Rejoice in Our Sufferings," in
Michael J. Taylor S.J. ed. The Mystery of Suffering and Death (New
York: Abba House, 1973), 47-55.
^20johan Christiaan Beker, "Suffering and Triumph in Paul's
Letter to the Romans," Horizons in Biblical Theology: An
International Dialogue vol. 7, no. 2 (December 1985), 105-119-
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time.
2-^Not only so, but we ourselves, who have the
firstfruits of the Spirit, groan inwardly as we wait
eagerly for our adoption as sons, the redemption of
our bodies. ^^For in this hope we were saved. But
hope that is seen is no hope at all. Who hopes for
what he already has? ^Sg^^ hope for what we
do not yet have, we wait for it patiently . �'�^�^
Evidenced in these verses is Paul's sympathetic responses to
creation's plight of subjection to futility. He is
concerned with suffering occasioned by deterioration and
degeneration of the creation. A few examples will suffice
to clarify the type of suffering Paul was alluding to:
human illnesses, the devastation of plant life on earth, the
occurrences of natural disasters and disruptions in the
animal kingdom. �'�^^ They seem to have no purpose, yet no
one doubts their reality. Paul even thinks they are the
cornerstone to existence on earth. -^23 when faced with
suffering on the personal level, Paul forms an image of a
transcendent world in which this type of suffering will be
absent. -'�2'* And he calls upon Christian believers to
pursue this claim. He admonishes Christians that they are
the Sons of God, through who God will save the universe.
He tells them that it is through them that God intends to
i2iRomans 18-30 NIV; Ibid.
^22joseph Blenkinsop, "We Rejoice in our Sufferings" in Michael
J. Taylor S.J. ed. The Mvsterv of Suffering and Death (New York:
Abba House, 1973), 47-55.
I23ibid.
124ibid.
exterminate suffering, -"-^^ Paul gives meaning to
suffering. He does so by elucidating their causes: he makes
a casual connection between sin, suffering and death. -^26
Different interpretations to this connection of sin and
suffering which Paul makes. The first is the traditional
view. The story starts with Adam, Eve and the Fall. This
view says all kinds of suffering came to earth because of
sin. �'�2^ Some scholars disagree with this
interpretation. -^28 rjnj^g argument is that Paul never said
all sins came as the result of sin. The solution captures
Paul himself mystified by the mystery of meaningless and
purposeless suf fering. -"-^^
Perhaps Paul's words in Romans, Chapter six and First
Corinthians, Chapter 15 offers us a better insight into his
thoughts on suffering. One thing is clear. Christ has
destroyed both sin and death. However, Christians are not
yet free from the power of death. We wait for the return of
Christ. At His return He will finally bury the power of
death. ^-^^ In the meantime, Paul admonishes Christians who
are suffering this advice and he summarized in one word:
i26ibid.
127ibid.
128ibid.
129ibid.
130ibid.
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hope. -^^-^
Paul admonishes suffers that God cares for them. God's
care comes often through comfort given by other people.
Since every human being is liable to suffer, Paul advises
those who have received comfort in their own periods of
suffering to give comfort to others, who are suffering. Our
Savior suffers, and each time we suffer, we share in His
suffering. -'�^^ Finally, Paul told Christians that our
suffering has the potential means through which God's power
can be revealed to many other people. ^-^-^
In closing, let me mention Romans 1:1-5; Phillipians 3:
2 Corinthians 1:5-10; 2 Corinthians 4:7-10. All of these
scriptural passages are connected with the "Interchange":
that Christ became what we are in order that in Him we might
become what He is.-^-^"* Morna Hooker reminds us that what
therefore happens to us, as a result of what happens to Him,
happens only because we share in His experience of
vindication and reversal. We have in these scriptures
the mystery of a God who suffers with men from sin and its
^3^Ibid.
I32ibid.
i^^ibid.
^^'^Morna Hooker, "Interchange and Suffering," in William
Harburg and Bran McNeil, eds.. Suffering and Martvdom in the New
Testament (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 70-83.
l^^Ibid.
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violence against His Son.^^^ Though the Bible makes this
connection, it does not explain suffering in real, definite
terms; rather scripture praises the worth of suffering as a
learning and a purifying experience . �'��^^
As a matter of fact, we Christians have victory of
death through Christ, but at the same time we live in a
world where sufferings exists. "To believe that Jesus is
risen and death has been overcome does not mean suppressing
suffering, on the contrary, it means making suffering more
painful. "1^�
Summary
Both the biblical teachings of Apostle Paul and the
philosophical teachings of Frederick Nietzsche gave meaning
to human freedom, suffering and death. However, they gave
two different sets of meanings to these concepts. Frederick
Nietzsche assigned meaning to human freedom, suffering and
death within the framework of existentialist categories.
Apostle Paul assigned meaning to these concepts within the
biblical parameters of Providence, Eschatology and destiny.
i^^Ibid.
l^'^Ibid.
I38ibid.
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CHAPTER 4
COMPARISON OF TWO MORAL SYSTEMS
4 . 1 Introduction
Conceptions of human freedom, suffering and death, both
in Frederick Nietzsche and Apostle Paul have a background.
The former is grounded extentialist � philosophy and the
latter in biblical theology. Thus, we are ushered into two
different value systems: secular existentialism and the
Pauline tradition. Our task then is to find out what
approach each of these value systems will take to the
ethical issue of withholding and withdrawing life-support
from the critically-ill. In this process we shall determine
whether the ethical procedures each employ is appropriate
for distinguishing between passive Euthanasia and legitimate
acts of forgoing life-support.
In the Nietzschean world, God is dead without a
creator, human being no longer owe any moral obligation to
God. Also they have no special place in the created order
of things. We expected someone in such a world to decide
different or moral issues than a person who lives in a world
in which God is the Creator and man is created in the image
of God.
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4.2 Nietzschean and Ethical Decision-Making
Frederick Nietzsche distinguishes between true morality
and false morality- The Judeo-Christian value system
promotes false morality. True morality advances the "will
to power" . Rather than an ethic which promotes love and
rejects life, Nietzschean ethic counsels affirmation and
acceptance of life as it is in nature. Stemming from this
counsel is a notion which gives the human will superiority
over human reason. With an absence of absolute values from
any external source in his ethic, the philosopher advises
every individual to create their own values. He stresses
individual morality meaning that individual persons do what
makes life worth living. ^ Within this scheme of things, an
individual has a role in moral decision-making. Moral
rightness or moral wrongness is entirely the individual's
responsibility to decide. On the more subjective level, a
person faced with any moral dilemma has to make a choice.
If he or she dose not choose, then others will make the
choice for him. But those people who allow others to make
moral decisions for them do not live authentically.^ The
existential ethic of decision-making of this type is
^Howard A. Slaatte, A Critical Survey of Ethics. 210-210.
^ibid.
�^Virginia L. Warren, "A Kierkegaardian Approach to Moral
Philosophy: The Process of Moral Decision-Making," The Journal of
Religious Ethics.
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characterized as choosing oneself. Choosing oneself
implies that individual persons are in control, he decides
the how and what in any decision-making situation. One has
to choose oneself as he or she actually is: that is what is
meant by "choosing oneself".^ We can interpret Nietzsche
position of choice in two ways. First, we can say choice is
both necessary and sufficient condition for being ethical.
It means that the specific content of the choice does not
matter .
Second, we can say that choice is a necessary condition
for being ethical, while choosing the correct content is a
sufficient for being ethical.^ For the physician, passive
Euthanasia, and in some cases legitimate acts of forgoing
life-support, are created by conflicting duties: the duty
to do no harm and the duty to alleviate suffering. The
boundaries between passive Euthanasia and legitimate
forgoing of life-support become almost indistinguishable, if
the right to choose becomes the main component in the
decision. The same applies to physicians who are pressed to
make choices when confronted with the situation. If they
decide to look for an authority on ethical matters to tell
them the morally correct action to take before they carry it
out, this ethic would see that they are evading their
"*Ibid.
^Ibid.
^Ibid.
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responsibilities.^ This ethical system might perceive them
as not acting discriminately, because they fail to recognize
their responsibilities of making the decision. In fact,
this moral system scorns physicians who when faced with
those decisions involving the withdrawal of life-support
will consult the patient's family, a hospital ethics
committee, or any moral experts.� Also appalling to the
system would be those physicians who are uncertain about
"who should make the decision?" The rationale for this
attitude in this ethical system is based upon the notion
that to entrust the making of a difficult moral decision to
another person is to give away the benefits of "choosing
oneself".^ Physicians who do delegate such a beneficial
opportunity, also forgo their chance to understand human
dignity and pain, grief and death, and are insensitive to
others' feelings and are selfish. �'�^
4.3 Paul and Ethical Decision-Making
John Kilner deals with the Pauline moral system,
particularly as it involves ethical decision-making . In
an article A Pauline Approcah to Ethical Decision-Making.
�'ibid.
�Ibid.
^Ibid.
lOjbid.
^^John Kilner, "A Pauline Approach to Ethical Decision-
Making," Interpretations .
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Kilner maintains that the Apostles' approach exhibit three
characteristics: "It is God-centered, reality bound, and
love impelled. "12 Important in Kilner 's exposition of
Paul's ethical system is his mentioning that all these three
characteristics are intertwined. We cannot focus only upon
one of them without recourse to the others. Our study
reveals that Paul gave signification to human freedom,
suffering and death within the context of providence,
dignity and Eschatology. Paul's approach is endowed with
certain constraints. Be it either God-centered, reality-
bound and love-impelled as in Kilner or providence, dignity
and Eschatology as in our study, all of these are "rooted in
the consistently trustworthy character and purpose of
God" . 1^
Those constraints brought to bear on our impending
issue of forgoing life support, three ethical centers
emerge: sanctity of life, freedom and responsibility.
Let us consider the sanctity of life. "Sanctity of
life" holds the view that all human lives, irrespective of
their quality or kind, are equally valuable and
inviolable. �^^'^ Frequently textbooks use other synonyms
such as "dignity of human life" and the "sacredness of human
i^ibid.
i^Ibid.
^"^Norman L. Geisler, "Sanctity of Human Life," in S. Kantzer
Applying the Scriptures (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Zondervan
Publishing House, 1987), 139-160.
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life". By definition, it seems "sanctity of life" is saying
that "every life" and "every moment of life" have absolute
and infinite value, regardless of its condition or
quality.-'-^ If this is the case, then it opposes any
attempt to remove or withhold life-support from critically-
ill patients based upon the quality of life judgments.
Furthermore, any form of active killing is ruled out, no
matter how compassionate the motives physicians would
present. Therefore, taking to the extreme interpretation,
"sanctity of human life" holds that physicians should
continue normal forms of care and medical efforts for a
patient, no matter how ill he might be. This is an absolute
form of the sanctity of life ethic. �'�^ Life-support should
not be withdrawn or withhold for any reason whatsoever,
given that they are defined as ordinary treatment.
We have seen that Paul gave human suffering, freedom
and death meaning within the context of providence
Eschatology and destiny. Life has special meaning within
that context life story encloses the atoning work done by
Jesus Christ, its redemptive power and availability to
everyone. Sanctity of life within these parameters defines
for us a comprehensive picture of God's purpose for human
beings. Not only does it define God's purpose, it also maps
out our responsibilities towards God. It is dependent upon
^^Encyclopedia of Bioethics. Warren T. Reid.
i^Ibid.
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ethical convictions that extend beyond mere biological life
to include social, psychological, mental and other human
qualities. In consonant with these characteristics of the
"sanctity of life" ethos, J. Robert Nelson detailed eight
Christian affirmations which he said belong to Christians of
all denominations. He related these to the sanctity of
human life, especially as it concerns abortion. Of
relevance to this discussion of sanctity of life are the
sixth, seventh, and eighth affirmations.
"True humanity is not found in individualization, but
in human community. The creator decreed that 'it is not
good' for the creature to live alone, and caused life to be
relational and communal in its essence". "The definition
and identity of human life must be given in terms of
personhood and not alone in terms of living tissue".
For Christian faith, the definition of life in terms of
personhood is determined by the acknowledgement of Jesus
Christ as the true pattern of authentic personhood and as
the divine Lord of Life. Our opinion is that within this
non-absolutist interpretation of the "sanctity of life",
certain situations exist in which the non-preservance of
life may be the ethical thing to do. However, the sanctity
of life principle acts as the barometer to check whether
death is intended in acts of withdrawal and withholding of
I'^J. Robert Nelson, "What Does Theology Say About Abortion,"
in Edward Batchelor's Abortion ; The Moral Issues (New York:
Pilgrim Press, 1982), 55-57.
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life-support systems from critically-ill patients. However,
it is not the single parameter that should be considered,
when decisions are made. Human freedom and human
responsibility are two other parameters. Though they may be
assigned different meanings as we saw in Paul and Nietzsche,
they involve some form of choice. In the case of Nietzsche
unlimited choice is under self-determination, and in Paul it
is choice under certain constraints: God-centered, reality-
bound and love-impelled. Could we say that this
characteristic of Paul's approach is act-deontological?
Therefore the Pauline approach combines both
teleological and deontological theories. Furthermore, it
combines traditional "abstract thought" and choice of the
existentialists .
4 . 4 Summary
At this juncture, let us clarify certain points: (1)
The non-absolutist interpretation of the sanctity of life
allows life support to be withdrawn or withheld on some
occasions. (2) The sanctity of life acts as a barometer to
determine the difference between acts of passive Euthanasia
and legitimate acts of foregoing life support. (3) Pauline
ethic combines both teleological and deontological moral
theories, abstract thought and choice. Using Pauline
i^Virginia L. Warren, "A Kierkegaardian Approach to Moral
Philosophy; Martin E. Marty and Kenneth L. Vaux (ed) Health-
Medicine and the Faults Traditions: An Inquiry into Religion and
Medicine (Philadelphia: Forbes Press, 1982), 215-228.
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approach, we can distinguish between passive Euthanasia and
legitimate acts of withdrawing and withholding life-support
from the critically-ill.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
5 . 1 Summary
Our conceptions of human freedom, suffering and death
influences how we make decisions to withdraw and withhold
life-support from critically ill patients. These
conceptions enter into these decisions through certain
deontological and/or teleological principles. Sometimes,
though, these conceptions could enter decisions through
moral principles which have no philosophical or theological
basis .
Evidently, our conception of human freedom, suffering
and death are defined by our philosophical and/or
theological outlook: utilitarian, secular existential or
biblical Christian. The meaning which the Bible ascribes to
human freedom, suffering and death provides a moral
framework within which satisfactory decisions to forgo life-
support can be made, especially when these decisions involve
Christian patients.
It touches on the most relevant question that needs to
be asked, when considering the withdrawing and withholding
of life-support, namely: is death intended? Any value
92
system which has the basis upon which we answer this
question, provides a suitable framework for distinguishing
between acts of passive Euthanasia and legitimate acts of
forgoing life support.
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